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INTRODUCTION
Professor Herbert Morris has famously argued that criminal
offenders possess a moral right to be punished for their offenses.'
This right is derived from a more fundamental natural right-
inalienable and absolute-to be treated as a person. 2 Because
persons have a right to have their choices respected, when one
responsibly chooses to engage in conduct prohibited by a just system
of criminal law,3 one chooses the consequences of the violation:
1. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment in PUNISHMENT (Joel Feinberg &
Hyman Gross eds., (1975). For an example of the influence of Morris's work, see
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 48-49 (1976). Professor Morris's paper is
reprinted in numerous collections of essays on punishment. See, e.g., PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 116 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972); SENTENCING 93
(Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981).
2. The right is "inalienable" in the sense that the right cannot be waived or
transferred to another, and "absolute" in the sense
that it always exists, even if occasions arise requiring that a person be denied the
right. Morris, supra note 1, at 84-86.
3. Professor Morris's right to be punished is applicable only within a legal
system which conditions punishment on a careful finding that a person is guilty of
violating a "primary rule," which is similar to a core rule of our criminal law. To
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punishment.4 Non-punitive responses-most notably compulsory
rehabilitative therapy-regard deviant conduct as merely
symptomatic of an unhealthy status condition plaguing the offender
rather than the product of a responsible moral agent. 5
Paternalistically imposing compulsory rehabilitative regimens on
morally accountable offenders 6 disregards the offender's right to be
punished. 7
I have suggested elsewhere that the right to be punished may be
constitutionally protected under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.8 I have also
explored the extent to which juveniles might enjoy the protections of
this right, while Professor Sanford Fox has raised his influential
voice in arguing for this right without explicitly grounding it in the
Constitution.9 Thus, rather than experiencing the parens patriae
avoid unjust applications of punishment, accused offenders must be afforded a
variety of substantive defenses permitting them to show that their offenses were
involuntary or otherwise excusable. Moreover, the system must provide safeguards
against double jeopardy and self-incrimination, rights to trial by jury, requirements
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a prerequisite to conviction, and protections
against punishment that is disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense or the
culpability of the offender. Morris, supra note 1, at 75-78.
4. Professor Morris justifies the institution of punishment both as a necessary
means of promoting compliance with the law and as a requirement of justice. Id. at
75-80. Justice demands that an offender be punished in order to restore the
equilibrium lost through the offender's renunciation of the burdens of law-abiding
conduct. Without punishment, the offender would gain an unfair advantage over law-
abiding citizens since he would receive the benefits of life within the legal order
without assuming the burdens of restraining his conduct in accordance with the
rules of the legal system. Id.
5. Id. at 76-80.
6. Id. at 79-80.
7. For a theory similar to Morris's, see C.S. Lewis, Humanitarian Theory of
Punishment, 6 RES. JUD. 224 (1953).
8. Martin R. Gardner, The Right to be Punished-A Suggested Constitutional
Theory, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 838 (1981). I argue also that offenders may choose not to
assert their right to be punished and choose instead to accept an executive pardon if
offered or therapeutic treatment in lieu of punishment should the state offer such a
choice. Id. at 852-53.
9. Martin R. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders to be Punished: Some
Implications of Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. REV. 182 (1989). While it may
be difficult to imagine how a juvenile would ever see it desirable to assert a right to
be punished, one need only consider the facts of the most famous Supreme Court
juvenile justice case, In re Gault, to see the possible value of the right's constitutional
recognition. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1987). In Gault, a juvenile court judge
committed fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault to the State Industrial School for the
remainder of his minority, "that is until [age] 21, unless sooner discharged." Id. at 7.
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dispensations of traditional juvenile courts, 10 the argument is that to
the extent that older juveniles function as adults, they may be
entitled to the right to be punished for their offenses rather than
being subjected to the sometimes more onerous "rehabilitative"
dispositions imposed by juvenile courts. 11
Although some social science data supports the claim that
adolescents are functionally equivalent to adults in terms of
cognitive ability 12 and a few Supreme Court cases specifically
identify juveniles as "persons"'13 in light of a recent series of cases
An adult committing the same offense as Gerald-making an obscene phone call-
could have been punished by no more than a five to fifty dollar fine or a jail sentence
up to two months. Id. at 8. Gerald may well have preferred to be punished for a
maximum of two months in jail rather than be subjected to up to six years
incarceration in a secure state facility.
In addition to substantive issues, recognition of a right to be punished
would also afford juveniles procedural advantages not otherwise available within the
juvenile justice system. For example, due process procedural protections in "reverse
certification" proceedings from criminal court to juvenile court would be required,
allowing the juvenile the opportunity to assert his right to be punished in criminal
court rather than rehabilitated in the juvenile system. See Gardner supra note 9, at
212-13. See infra notes 278-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of reverse
certification. For Fox's argument that "children have a right to be punished for what
they have done, not to be treated for what someone else thinks they are," see Sanford
J. Fox, The Reform of Juvenile Justice: The Child's Right to Punishment, Juv. JUST.,
Aug. 1974, at 2, 6.
10. See infra notes 54-79.
11. See infra notes 9, 13 and accompanying text.
12. Empirical studies indicate that nothing distinguishes adolescent decision-
making competency from adults. A commentator summarized the existing social
science literature as follows: "[The] findings, suggest that adolescents, aged 14 and
older, possess the cognitive capability to reason, understand, appreciate, and
articulate decisions comparable to young adults .... There is a paucity of scientific
or social science study that supports the present legal view of adolescent incapacity"
suggesting "a promising legacy for the recognition of adolescent autonomous rights."
Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1286 (2000).
Such findings lead some to conclude that the law should treat adolescents
as autonomous persons: "[A]dolescents' personhood should be recognized by
policymakers. Insofar as denial of autonomy has been based on assumptions of
incompetence, current psychological research does not support such an age-graded
distinction." Gary B. Melton, Toward "Personhood" for Adolescents: Autonomy and
Privacy as Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99, 102 (1983).
13. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (holding
that school students are "persons" under the Constitution and thus enjoy First
Amendment rights at school, specifically the right to wear black armbands to protest
the Vietnam War); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-74 (1976)
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disallowing capital punishment and life sentences without parole,
(LWOP), as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment 14 when
applied to juveniles, the Court has now recognized that rather than
enjoying a right to be punished, young people, specifically
adolescents, instead uniquely possess the quite different-indeed in
many ways antithetical-constitutional "right to a meaningful
opportunity to be rehabilitated."'15 This right is based on the Court's
("[M]inors as well as adults ... possess constitutional rights" to abort pregnancies
and such "rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains
the state-defined age of majority.").
14. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. See infra Part III for discussion of the Court's cases.
15. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text. A variety of lower courts
have previously recognized a statutory right to rehabilitation or "treatment" of
juvenile offenders confined in state institutions. See, e.g., State v. S.H., 877 P.2d.
205, 216 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (juvenile statute creates a "statutory duty to provide
treatment"); J.D.W. v. Harris, 319 S.E.2d 815, 822 n.10 (W. Va. 1984) (providing for a
"statutory right to rehabilitation and treatment"); State v. Trent, 289 S.E.2d 166, 175
(W. Va. 1982) (state statutes authorizing institutionalization of juveniles are aimed
at rehabilitation, therefore juveniles "must be given treatment").
Moreover, some lower courts have also recognized federal constitutional
rights to rehabilitation for confined juvenile offenders. See, e.g., Alexander v. Boyd,
876-F. Supp. 773, 797 n.43 (D.S.C. 1995) (juveniles "are entitled.., to rehabilitative
treatment" under Fourteenth Amendment Due Process); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437
F. Supp. 1209, 1219 (E.D. La. 1976) ("[tlhe constitutional right [of delinquents] to
treatment is a right to a program of treatment that affords the individual a
reasonable chance to acquire . . .skills" necessary to cope with the demands of life);
Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 459 (N.D. Ind. 1972), affd 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.
1974) ("juvenile offenders are [constitutionally] entitled to rehabilitative efforts"). On
the other hand, some courts have held that reasons other than rehabilitation-
protection of society and protection of the juvenile from a dangerous or unhealthy
environment-suffice to justify institutional confinement. See, e.g., Santana v.
Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176 (1st Cir. 1983). In the eyes of these courts, juveniles do
not enjoy a constitutional right to rehabilitation.
Prior to the cases discussed infra at Part III, the Supreme Court had not
spoken to whether or not offenders enjoy a constitutional right to rehabilitation. A
leading commentator summarized the situation as follows: "For the time being, it
would be sheer speculation to predict what the Supreme Court's response might be to
a right to treatment claim by juveniles." SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES:
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 526 (2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter RIGHTS OF
JUVENILES].
However, the Supreme Court has held that adults possess neither a right to
rehabilitation nor parole release. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 862 (2011)
(per curiam) ("There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally
released before the expiration of a valid sentence, and the States are under no duty
to offer parole to their prisoners.") (citation omitted). Thus, determinate sentences
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identification of adolescents as, among other things, singularly
amenable to rehabilitation, thus designating them a categorically
distinct class from adults. Specifically, as I will show, the Court's
decisions logically extend beyond LWOP sentences and strongly
suggest that it is now unconstitutional to punish adolescent
offenders with any sentence of imprisonment without providing for
their possible rehabilitation. 16
The implications of this new constitutional right to rehabilitation
for adolescents are far reaching, affecting both the juvenile and
criminal justice systems. Indeed, one commentator has observed that
the Court's Eighth Amendment cases raise "questions about the
constitutionality of any sentencing scheme that fails to take account
of the ... differences between children and adults," 17 especially the
unique potential of youthful offenders to reform. This Article
explores those questions. I will demonstrate that the emphasis on
rehabilitation does not necessarily spell the demise of all
punishment of youthful offenders, whether in the criminal or
juvenile system. I thus reject the view of some that the Court's
recognition of the fundamental differences between adolescents and
adults logically leads to the conclusion that juveniles may never be
tried in adult criminal court. 18
To understand the potential scope of the Court's implicit
conclusion that the punishment of adolescents is unconstitutional
unless a meaningful opportunity for rehabilitation is afforded, it is
necessary to carefully distinguish and clarify the distinction between
the conflicting concepts of punishment and rehabilitation. I therefore
begin Part I by analyzing this distinction. Since the logic of the
Court's decisions impacts the punishment of adolescents in both the
juvenile and criminal justice contexts, I contrast the two systems in
Part II by tracing the development of the juvenile court movement
with no opportunities for rehabilitation are perfectly legal for adults.
16. See infra notes 230-66 and accompanying text.
17. Marsha Levick et al., The Eighth Amendment Evolves: Defining Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Through the Lens of Childhood and Adolescent, 15 U. PA. J.L.
& SOC. CHANGE 283, 321 (2012). In discussing the Roper case, an early decision in
the line of cases that will be considered later in this article, one commentator
presciently observed: "Roper may open the door for [various] sentences imposed on
juvenile offenders to be deemed unconstitutional. [Tihe United States may begin to
see a shift in the philosophy and focus of the juvenile justice system back to one of
rehabilitation, rather than punishment." Julie Rowe, Mourning the Untimely Death
of the Juvenile Death Penalty: An Examination of Roper v. Simmons and the Future
of the Juvenile Justice System, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 287, 289 (2006). For discussion of
Roper, see infra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 226.
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from its original rehabilitative origins towards an increasingly
punitive model, dispensing dispositions traditionally found only in
the criminal system. In Part III, I discuss the Court's Eighth
Amendment cases from which the right to an opportunity for
rehabilitation emerges, examining in Part IV this right's
implications for juveniles within the criminal justice system,
showing specifically that juvenile offenders are now entitled to: (1)
systematically less punishment than that imposed on adults
committing the same offenses; (2) a robust individualized pre-
sentencing hearing, taking into account, among other things, the
offender's amenability to rehabilitation; (3) a disposition in the
juvenile system if, at the pre-sentencing hearing, the offender is
deemed to be amenable to rehabilitation and the juvenile system
affords the best opportunity for its realization; and (4) a sentence
offering a realistic possibility for rehabilitation and parole if the
offender is deemed not amenable to rehabilitation at the pre-
sentencing hearing.
In Part V, I explore the ramifications of the right to a meaningful
opportunity for rehabilitation for the juvenile system, concluding: (1)
that rehabilitative juvenile justice systems are now constitutionally
mandated; (2) that for all juveniles charged with criminal offenses,
jurisdiction must now originate in juvenile court with transfer to
criminal court permitted only if a juvenile court judge finds that an
accused is not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system;
and (3) for punishment within the juvenile system, the same judicial
hearing and parole release requirements applicable to criminal court
punishment are now equally required. Finally, in Part VI, I show
that these manifestations of the right to a meaningful opportunity
for rehabilitation are not waiveable by juvenile offenders and that
implementation of this right would require considerable reform of
current practices in both the criminal and juvenile systems.
I. PUNITIVE Vs. REHABILITATIVE DISPOSITIONS:
THE CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTION
Before examining the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment case
law concerning adolescent offenders, it is helpful to understand the
role played by the rehabilitative ideal in the traditional juvenile
court movement. While the effort to rehabilitate through state
intervention was the raison d'etre for the advent of juvenile courts,
adolescent offenders were always subject to possible punishment
through waivers of jurisdiction from juvenile to criminal courts. 19
19. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, punishment is now an increasingly common occurrence
within the juvenile system itself.20
A separate system of juvenile courts originated in large part to
provide a "civil" rehabilitative, non-punitive alternative to deal with
young people who violate criminal law. 21 The legislative choice of a
system that rehabilitates rather than punishes was not simply an
important policy decision, but also one of constitutional import.
Impositions of "punishment" trigger legal consequences peculiar to
that sanction.22 Of particular importance for purposes of this Article,
punitive sanctions alone are candidates for prohibition as cruel and
unusual under the Eighth Amendment, while non-punitive
dispositions, rehabilitative ones for example, are outside the
Amendment's scope. 2 3 Thus, to understand the respective roles of
rehabilitation and punishment within the juvenile justice system, as
well as to comprehend the Court's recent recognition of the right to
an opportunity for rehabilitation flowing from the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause-a right entailing both the concepts of
rehabilitation and punishment-it is necessary to be clear about how
coercive rehabilitation and punishment differ. As grounded in the
Eighth Amendment, the rehabilitation right is triggered only if a
punitive disposition is at stake.24
20. See infra notes 80-93 and accompanying text; see generally, Martin R.
Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice and Public Trials by Jury: Sixth Amendment
Applications in a Post-McKeiver World, 91 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter
Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice].
21. See infra notes 54-79 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of various constitutional protections applicable only when
punishment is employed, Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 20, at 11-12,
21-22 (2012). See also infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the presence of punishment as a necessity for relief under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, see infra notes 23, 70-77 and
accompanying text.
23. "[An imposition must be 'punishment' for the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause to apply." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 n.39 (1977).
The Court did allow, however, that "some punishments though, not labeled 'criminal'
by the State, may be sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments .. . to justify
application of the Eighth Amendment," noting that "[wle have no occasion in this
case, for example, to consider . . . under what circumstances persons involuntarily
confined in mental or juvenile institutions can claim the protection of the Eighth
Amendment." Id. at 669 n.37.
24. See infra notes 310-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
necessity of distinguishing punishment and rehabilitation in understanding the
constitutional impact of the rehabilitation right on presentencing practices in
juvenile courts. I have elsewhere drawn the conceptual distinction developed in the
text immediately infra. See Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 20, at 13-
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A. Punishment
Notwithstanding the unique legal significance of governmental
imposition of punishment, the Supreme Court has never provided a
precise definition of that sanction.25 However, from the Court's cases,
it is possible to make the following general observations: a sanction
is punitive if a legislature so labels it,26 and the Court will otherwise
defer to the legislature if it labels a sanction non-punitive or "civil,"
unless a party challenging the sanction shows by the "clearest proof'
that it is "so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the
State's] intention to deem it civil."27 Moreover, in addressing the
question of punitive purpose or effect, the Court routinely alludes to
the "useful guideposts" 28 established in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez,29 which outlines "the tests traditionally applied to
determine whether [a sanction] is penal . . . in character." 30 These
tests include the following:
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether
an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
22; Martin R. Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Framework
for Assessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REV. 791, 798-
800 (1982) [hereinafter Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice].
25. The Court first attempted to define punishment in mid-nineteenth century
cases arising under the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses. See Cummings
v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 286-322 (1866) (finding that a teacher-priest was
unconstitutionally punished by imposition of a $500 fine for continuing to teach
without taking a required oath of allegiance to the Union under a state
constitutional provision enacted after the teacher had begun teaching).
26. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003). The Court has characterized the
framework described immediately hereafter in the text as the "well established"
basis for determining the presence of punishment. For examples of cases following
the framework, see Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 20, at 13 n.48.
27. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361
(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Id. at 97 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 95, 99 (1997)).
29. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (holding that forfeiture
of citizenship rights for fleeing the United States to avoid the draft constituted
"punishment," thus triggering the protections of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments).
30. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168.
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connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.3 1
These factors establish that punishment entails intentionally
inflicting unpleasantness ("an affirmative disability or restraint")
upon one engaging in undesirable "behavior" for purposes of exacting
"retribution" and achieving "deterrence." So understood, punishment
imposes unpleasantness upon a person as a response to his or her
commission of a wrongful act.32 Furthermore, the Court's attention
to "scienter" in Mendoza-Martinez suggests that punishment is
characteristically imposed on offenders believed blameworthy.33
Thus, the state punishes when it purposely visits unpleasant
consequences upon blameworthy offenders who have violated legal
rules.
Although the Court has not emphasized the matter,
philosophical literature defining punishment has articulated an
additional central conceptual factor. Because punishment is a
response to past action, it is "determinate" in the sense that its
intensity and duration are set by the seriousness of the action to
which it responds. 34 As one commentator notes, "we would be
31. Id. at 168-69. For discussion of the problematic nature of the Court's
reference to whether a sanction "appears excessive in relation to the alternative
[non-punitive] purpose[s] assigned," see Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra
note 20, at 14 n.53.
32. This view of the Court's conception closely tracks H.L.A. Hart's famous
characterization of the "standard case" of legal punishment:
(i) [Punishment] must involve pain or other consequences normally
considered unpleasant.
(ii) It must be for an offence against legal rules.
(iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence.
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the
offender.
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a
legal system against which the offence is committed.
H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 4-5 (1969).
33. Richard Wasserstrom also emphasizes blameworthiness as a fundamental
precondition for punishment. Belief that the offender's action was "blameworthy" is a
necessary factor in his definition of punishment. Richard Wasserstrom, Some
Problems with Theories of Punishment, in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 173, 179 (J.B.
Cederblom & William L. Blizek eds., 1977). See infra note 36.
34. Punitive sentences are thus in a sense "fixed" and determined through
attempts to proportion punishment to the seriousness of the relevant offense. See,
e.g., Anthony A. Cuomo, Mens Rea and Status Criminality, 40 S. CALIF. L. REV. 463,
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punishing someone" if, in addition to imposing unpleasantness upon
an offender by virtue of the fact that he or she culpably acted, "we
determined-within at least some limits-at the time of our decision
to punish what the nature and magnitude of the [inflicted]
unpleasantness would be."35
To summarize, the Court's cases and the relevant philosophical
literature reveal the following framework for determining whether a
given sanction is punitive:
(1) If the sanction is labeled punitive by the legislature, it is
conclusively presumed to be so.
(2) If the legislative label or intent indicates that the
sanction is "civil," it will be presumed to be so unless it is
shown "by the clearest proof' to be punitive under the
following conception of punishment:
(a) The sanction involves an unpleasant restraint
purposely imposed by the state;
(b) The sanction is imposed upon a person because of an
offense;
(c) The sanction is imposed to achieve the purposes of
punishment-retribution and deterrence;
(d) The extent of the unpleasant restraint is known,
within possible limits, at the time of its imposition; and
(e) The sanction is generally imposed upon offenders
deemed to be blameworthy. 36
507 (1967). Justice Scalia has identified judicial imposition of fixed periods of
incarceration on uncooperative litigants as the basis for distinguishing "criminal"
contempt from "civil" contempt, which is characterized by indeterminate confinement
until a litigant complies with a specific order of the court. See Int'l Union, United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 521 U.S. 821, 840 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
35. Wasserstom, supra note 33, at 179; see also Morris, supra note 1, at 78
(noting that "with punishment there is an attempt at some equivalence between the
advantage gained by the wrongdoer-partly based upon the seriousness of the
interest invaded, partly on the state of mind with which the wrongful act was
performed-and the punishment meted out").
36. Some argue that the power of punishment to express social disapprobation
toward morally blameworthy offenders is the central characteristic that
distinguishes punishment from non-punitive sanctions. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart Jr.,
The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958) ("What
distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it ... is the
judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its
imposition."); see also Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in
DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98 (1970)
(arguing that judgments of disapproval and reprobation are part of the definition of
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As noted above, the distinction between punitive and
rehabilitative dispositions 37 is central to understanding the legal
consequences of the Supreme Court's constitutional recognition of a
rehabilitation right. After clarifying the concept of punishment,
attention will be turned to distinguishing it from rehabilitation.
B. Rehabilitation
Because coercive rehabilitation often entails significant
deprivations of liberty,38 it is sometimes mistakenly considered to be
punishment.39 However, therapeutic or rehabilitative dispositions
are premised on principles directly opposite those defining
punishment. Where punishment entails the purposeful infliction of
suffering upon its recipient, rehabilitation involves a beneficent
response 4° aimed at overcoming unwelcome aspects of its recipient's
life.
Moreover, while punishment is linked to proscribed actions,
rehabilitation is directed at alleviating a present unwelcome
legal punishment). For discussion of the view that punishment does not, by
definition, entail blameworthiness, see Martin R. Gardner, Rethinking Robinson v.
California in the Wake of Jones v. Los Angeles: Avoiding the 'Demise of the Criminal
Law by Attending to Punishment," 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 464-65 (2008)
[hereinafter Gardner, Rethinking].
37. Theorists have noted the significance-for both philosophical as well as
legal purposes--of distinguishing rehabilitation, often characterized as "treatment"
or "therapy," from punishment. See, e.g., TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE
SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 1 (1969); Morris, supra note 1; HERBERT L. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 25-28 (1968); Wasserstrom, supra note 33, at
179,180.
38. In juvenile justice, custodial confinement in "training schools" or "industrial
schools" for purposes of rehabilitation has been a dispositional alternative from the
beginning of the juvenile court movement. See MARTIN R. GARDNER,
UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 303-04 (4th ed. 2014).
39. Some commentators have defined sanctions as punitive if the sanction is
experienced as unpleasant by its recipients. Thus, if the "impact" of a sanction is to
visit upon its recipient unpleasant restrictions similar to those experienced by
persons who are punished--similar, for example, to deprivations existing in
prisons-then the sanction is considered "punishment" regardless of the state's
purpose in administering it. For a discussion of the impact theory and its
inadequacies as a definition of punishment, see Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice
supra note 20, at 17 n.61.
40. See PACKER, supra note 37, at 25 ("[T]he justification for [rehabilitation]
rests on the view that the person subjected to it is or probably will be "better off' as a
consequence."); Wasserstrom, supra note 33, at 179 ("[W]e would be treating
someone if.. . [w]e acted in [a] way . . . [which] would alter [the recipient's] condition
in a manner beneficial to him or her.").
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status.4 1 Wrongful conduct may be symptomatic of such status, but it
is not a necessary predicate for rehabilitation. 42 As punishment
responds to the commission of offenses, rehabilitation responds to
the needs of the person, whether or not he or she has committed
offenses. Finally, unlike punitive sentences which are determinate in
nature,4 3  rehabilitative dispositions are indeterminate upon
imposition given the impossibility of knowing the time needed to
rehabilitate a given offender."
41. See PACKER, supra note 37, at 25-26; Wasserstrom, supra note 33, at 179.
42. Offending conduct is the sine qua non of punishment but is not necessarily
relevant to dispensations of treatment. PACKER, supra note 37, at 26. Packer
explains:
[i]n the case of Punishment we are dealing with a person because he has
engaged in offending conduct; our concern is either to prevent the
recurrence of such conduct, or to inflict what is thought to be deserved pain,
or to do both. In the case of Treatment, there is no necessary relation
between conduct and Treatment; we deal with the person as we do because
we think he will be "better off' as a consequence.
Id.
43. See supra notes 34-35.
44. "[Tjreatment [for rehabilitation is] always subject to revision upon a
showing either: a. That an alternative response would be more beneficial to him or
her, or b. That his or her condition has altered so as to no longer require that, or any
other, further response." Wasserstrom, supra note 33, at 179. "The idea of treatment
necessarily entails individual differentiation, indeterminacy, a rejection of
proportionality, and a disregard of normative valuations of the seriousness of
behavior." Barry Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 91 (1997)
[hereinafter Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court]. In distinguishing offense-oriented
sentences (punitive) and offender-oriented ones (rehabilitative), Professor Feld
observes:
When based on the characteristics of the offense, the sentence usually is
determinate and proportional, with a goal of retribution or deterrence.
When based on the characteristics of the offender, however, the sentence is
typically indeterminate, with a goal of rehabilitation or incapacitation. The
theory that correctional administrators will release an offender only when
he is determined to be "rehabilitated" underlies indeterminate sentencing.
When sentences are individualized, the offense is relevant only for
diagnosis. Thus, it is useful to contrast offender-oriented dispositions, which
are indeterminate and non-proportional, with offense-based dispositions,
which are determinate, proportional, and directly related to the past
offense.
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C. Punishment v. Rehabilitation: Mutually Exclusive Dispositions?
In light of the above discussion, it is not surprising that many
consider punishment and coercive rehabilitation as mutually
exclusive sanctions.45  However, some disagree and consider
Barry Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment and the Different it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 847 (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets... Punishment].
45. Professor Feld sees an "innate contradiction" in attempting to combine a
"penal social control" function with a rehabilitative "social welfare" function. Feld,
Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 44, at 93.
Conceptually, punishment and treatment are mutually exclusive penal
goals. Both make markedly different assumptions about the sources of
criminal or delinquent behavior. Punishment assumes that responsible,
free-will moral actors make blameworthy choices and deserve to suffer the
prescribed consequences for their acts. Punishment imposes unpleasant
consequences because of an offender's past offenses. By contrast, most forms
of rehabilitative treatment . . . assume some degree of determinism ...
Mreatment assumes that certain antecedent factors cause the individual's
undesirable conditions or behavior. Treatment and therapy, therefore, seek
to alleviate undesirable conditions in order to improve the offender's future
welfare.
Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets . . . Punishment, supra note 44, at 833 (footnotes
omitted).
Professor Federle observes that "the juvenile court fluctuates between
punishment and rehabilitation without attempting to reconcile these opposing
justifications" which are "two [irreconcilable] polar impulses." Katherine Hunt
Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the Preservation of
Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CoNTEMP. L. 23, 38 (1990). H.L.A. Hart observes that
"[t]he ideals of Reform . . . (corrective training) . . . plainly run counter to . . .
[punitive] principles of Justice or proportion." Hart, supra note 32, at 25. Professor
Herbert Morris, as noted above, argues for a basic human right to be punished for
one's criminal offenses in stark contrast to being subjected to coercive rehabilitation
which disrespects human dignity. See generally Morris, supra note 1. Herbert Packer
adds that punishment and rehabilitation are "always distinguish[ed] ... [by] the
nature of the relationship between the offending conduct and what we do to the
person who has engaged in it." PACKER, supra note 37, at 26. He explains:
If we send [a troubled youth] to a school pursuant to a judgment that he has
engaged in offending conduct, we are subjecting him to Punishment; if we
think that he will be better off in jail than on the streets and proceed to lock
him up without a determination that he has engaged in offending conduct,
we are subjecting him to Treatment.
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punishment and rehabilitation compatible. 46 Both camps are correct,
depending on the context in which they make their claims.
Those seeing compatibility correctly point out that punishment
sometimes makes its recipient "better off."47 Adult inmates have long
been sent to penal institutions as punishment for committing
criminal offenses, but with hopes that they will also be
rehabilitated.48  While in practice these goals may well be
fundamentally at odds, 49 there are situations where individuals
emerge from prison "rehabilitated," at least in part as a consequence
of events or rehabilitation programs occurring within the prison.50
46. See In re Buehrer, 236 A.2d 592, 596-97 (N.J. 1967) (viewing probation as
both punitive and rehabilitative).
47. See PACKER, supra note 37, at 26-27; infra note 51 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. For example, the
punishments defined by the Model Penal Code are administered within a "general
framework of a preventative scheme" with "rehabilitation" as a "subsidiary" goal.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 explanatory note (Official Draft 1985).
Some claim that the introduction of the rehabilitative ideal into adult
criminal law theory meant that punishment, with its concerns for retribution and
deterrence, had been totally abandoned in favor of a systematically rehabilitative
and preventative model. See Jerome Hall, Justice in the 20th Century, 59 CALIF. L.
REV. 752, 753 (1971) (describing the widespread disillusionment with punishment in
the twentieth century with attendant disparagement of theories of deterrence and
retribution and the emergence of rehabilitation as "the single rational goa" of legal
policy).
However, the emergence of the rehabilitative ideal never meant the total
demise of punishment. Vestiges of retributivism remained in legislation embodying
the rehabilitative model. Sentences were based on legislative prescriptions of
maximum penalties based on offenses and considerations of relative
blameworthiness. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE 38 (1974). The commission of a criminal act as a necessary predicate for a
sentence thus belied any systematic rehabilitative model in favor of a "backward-
looking," desert-oriented system of justice.
49. In a famous statement expressing skepticism regarding the effectiveness of
rehabilitation within penal confinement, Judge Marvin Frankel said "no one should
ever be sent to prison for rehabilitation." United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp.
496, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (emphasis added). By the 1970s disillusionment with the
rehabilitative ideal had become widespread. See Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissance
of Retribution: An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 781, 782-83
[hereinafter Gardner, The Renaissance ofRetribution].
50. See Christoper Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 121, 132 (2005) (arguing that "properly conducted" programs of "risk
management" may effectuate offenders' ability to change their antisocial behavior).
But see Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, Spring 1974 PUB. INTEREST 22, 25 (arguing only in a "few and isolated"
situations do rehabilitative efforts in correctional institutions actually reduce
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In the juvenile justice context, one commentator made the
following observation: "[P]unishment and rehabilitation are
theoretically compatible. In recent years, researchers have begun to
suggest that some degree of punishment, especially for serious
offenders, is appropriate and compatible with the juvenile system's
child-centered philosophy... . [slome types of 'punishment' can serve
to rehabilitate a young offender."51
On the other hand, while rehabilitation may occur within a
punitive regime, 52 the concepts of punishment and rehabilitation are
mutually exclusive for purposes of assessing Eighth Amendment
applicability.5 3 If a given disposition is solely rehabilitative or
otherwise non-punitive, it is not subject to scrutiny under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Having clarified the respective meanings of punishment and
rehabilitation, consideration can now be directed to the role each
plays in the context of criminal acts committed by juveniles. As the
following discussion illustrates, both rehabilitation and punishment
are often aspects of juvenile offender dispositions imposed in either
juvenile or criminal courts.
recidivism).
51. Julianne P. Sheffer, Note, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes:
Reconciling Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48
VAND. L. REV. 479, 506-08 (1995) (arguing that scaled-down punishment in the
juvenile system followed by intensive follow up and counseling achieves effective
rehabilitation).
52. Similarly, punishment may occur within rehabilitative dispositions. See,
e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that
administering to hospitalized mental patient a drug, which induces vomiting as
"aversive stimuli," for allegedly violating behavior rule of the institution, constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment unless the inmate consents to the use of the drug).
However, the Supreme Court has arguably ruled that Eighth Amendment remedies
are unavailable to involuntarily committed mental patients even if hospital officials
are deliberately indifferent to their medical and psychological needs. See Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 312, 325 (1982) (holding that the lower court erred in
instructing the jury on the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard in
the case of a patient's allegations of unsafe conditions in the hospital where he was
confined). The Court noted with approval the position of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals that the "Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment of
those convicted of crimes, was not an appropriate source for determining the rights of
the involuntarily committed." Id. at 312.
53. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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II. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE MOVEMENT:
FROM REHABILITATIVE TO PUNITIVE DISPOSITIONS
A. The Rehabilitative Ideal and Original Juvenile Justice
The first juvenile court system was implemented in 1899.54 Prior
to that time, young people committing criminal offenses were
subjected to the same criminal court system and array of
punishments as adult offenders. 55 Even so, children had long been
recognized as different from adults, as exemplified by the common
law infancy defense reflecting the view that children lack the mature
ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions and are thus
less culpable and deterrable than their adult counterparts. 56 This
defense specified that children under the age of seven conclusively
lacked criminal responsibility thus exempting them from criminal
court jurisdiction; children between ages seven and fourteen were
subject to a rebuttable presumption of non-responsibility; 57 and
adolescents, those over the age of fourteen, were treated as adults.5 8
With the arrival of the twentieth century, progressive reformers
acted on these perceived differences between young people and
adults and established separate court systems for juveniles aimed at
rehabilitating those committing criminal offenses while attending to
the needs of other troubled youths not charged with violating
criminal statutes. 59 After its initial enactment in Illinois, 60 the
movement quickly spread nationwide and throughout Europe. 6 1
Underlying the movement was the belief that because of their
developing maturation, young people are by their nature uniquely
54. SAMUEL M. DAVIS, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW 253-54 (2011)
[hereinafter DAVIS, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS].
55. Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31
UCLA L. REV. 503, 509 (1984).
56. Id. at 509-10.
57. The presumption could be overcome by the prosecutor showing that the
young defendant in fact appreciated the wrongfulness of his or her actions. Id. at
510-11.
58. Id. Adolescence is often defined as the period beginning at age 14 and
extending to adulthood. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 12.
59. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets . . . Punishment, supra note 44, at 824;
Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 141
(1997).
60. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 1.
61. See Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal
Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439, 451
(1985).
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amenable to rehabilitation 62 while also being unfit subjects for
punishment because their immaturity renders them neither
culpable 63 nor deterrable. 64 As a manifestation of parens patriae
power,65 the juvenile court movement constituted an attempt to meet
the needs of youthful violators of criminal statutes-generally
referred to as "delinquents"-rather than to punish them for their
offenses. 66 "Dispositions" were "indeterminate,"6 7 possibly extending
throughout the period of minority, and were aimed at promoting the
62. Scott & Grisso, supra note 59, at 142. Young people were not the sole
subjects of the "rehabilitative ideal." Reformers had come to believe that all criminal
conduct was determined by underlying conditions affecting the offenders rather than
as the product of their free choices. Id. at 141. Thus, treatment, rather than
punishment, was the preferred disposition for adult offenders, although perhaps not
as successfully employed as in the case of their more malleable juvenile counterparts.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
63. See Sanford J. Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 659, 661-64 (1970).
64. Scott & Grisso, supra note 59, at 143. The juvenile court movement thus
extended the underlying predicates of the infancy defense not just to children under
the age of fourteen, but to all young people under the age of majority.
65. The original English concept of parens patriae, applied historically by
chancery courts, allowed courts to exercise the Crown's paternal prerogative to
declare a child a ward of the Crown when the parents had failed to maintain the
child's welfare. See generally Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery
to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205 (1971).
66. "Delinquents" are juveniles who commit offenses that would be crimes if
committed by an adult. MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 175
(4th ed. 2014). The fundamental concern of juvenile courts towards child offenders
was with "what is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in
his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career."
Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909). In
adopting reformation as its goal, the juvenile court movement eschewed retributivist
notions of guilt and blameworthiness. Francis Barry McCarthy, The Role of the
Concept of Responsibility in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 10 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 181, 207 (1977).
67. A "disposition" is a euphemism for a criminal court "sentence." The juvenile
court movement adopted a set of euphemisms to replace the stigmatic terminology of
criminal law. GARDNER, supra note 38, at 167. "Indeterminate" dispositions are those
with no set limit, which could continue until adulthood. Barry C. Feld, A Century of
Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Revolution that Failed? 34 N. Ky. L. REV.
189, 196 n.37 (2007) [hereinafter Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice]. The
rehabilitative objectives of the juvenile system were characterized by a system of
indeterminate sentencing in which the type and duration of sanctions were dictated
by the "best interests" of the offender rather than the seriousness of the offences.
Stephen Wizner & Mary F. Keller, The Penal Model of Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile
Court Delinquency Jurisdiction Obsolete? 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1120, 1121 (1977).
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best interests of the offender, rather than "determinate" in
proportion to the minor's offenses.
While enacted to function as rehabilitative alternatives to the
criminal system, juvenile courts from early on provided mechanisms
to transfer ("waive") juvenile court jurisdiction to criminal court in
certain cases. 68 Once transferred to criminal court, juveniles enjoyed
the full array of procedural protections of the criminal process while
being subject to all the punishments imposed upon convicted
adults. 69
In opting for a "civil" rehabilitative alternative to the punitive
system, reformers moved in a new policy direction70  with
constitutional implications. As mentioned above, impositions of
punishment generate constitutional consequences, triggering
rights---"some substantive[,]7 1 others procedural[-]under various
Bill of Rights provisions applicable to 'criminal' cases 72 and
'prosecutions."'73 Such rights do not necessarily apply to proceedings
68. "In 1903 ... the Chicago juvenile court transferred fourteen children to the
adult criminal system." Stephen Wizner, Discretionary Waiver of Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction: An Invitation to Procedural Arbitrariness, 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41, 42
(1984). Such a trend continued into the 1970s, when every American jurisdiction had
laws authorizing or requiring criminal prosecution of certain minors in adult courts.
Id.; see also Barry C. Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The
Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 516
n.5 (1978) (discussing the varied terminology used to describe the juvenile waiver
procedure). Waiver is generally reserved for those youths whose "highly visible,
serious, or repetitive criminality raises legitimate concern for public safety or
community outrage." Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the
Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal", 65 MINN. L. REV.
167, 171 (1980). However, many youths committing minor offenses are also dealt
with in criminal court, perhaps because of the unavailability of fines as a juvenile
court sanction. Stephen Wizner, Discretionary Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction:
An Invitation to Procedural Arbitrariness, 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41, 44-45 (1984).
69. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 15, at 214. As noted above, the
Supreme Court has, however, recently found that certain punishments constitute
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment when applied to
offenders who commit their crimes while under eighteen years of age. See infra Part
III.
70. At the same time the rehabilitative ideal was being embodied in the new
juvenile movement, similar policies were enacted in the criminal law as
indeterminate sentencing emerged in the attempt to rehabilitate adult offenders
within prisons, if possible, and restrain them therein if deemed dangerous and
unrehabilitated. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 9-10.
71. See Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 20, at 11 n.37 for a




dispensing such non-punitive sanctions as coerced rehabilitation. 74
Moreover, distinguishing punishment from rehabilitation is
constitutionally necessary in light of the Supreme Court's
proclamation in Robinson v. California75 that a person may never be
"punished" under the Eighth Amendment for undesirable status
conditions, but may be subjected to compulsory rehabilitation or
medical "treatment."76 Thus, if a juvenile justice system were in fact
"punitive," even though nominally "rehabilitative," it would become
a "criminal" legal system subject to those requirements unique to
state impositions of punishment. 77
At the same time the rehabilitative ideal was finding its place in
the juvenile court movement, a similar policy was emerging in the
criminal law as indeterminate sentencing and parole release were
embraced as aspects of the attempt to rehabilitate adult offenders
within prisons, and to restrain therein dangerous, unrehabilitated
offenders. 78 Today, many jurisdictions continue indeterminate
sentencing with inmates being released from confinement when
parole boards find them rehabilitated. 79
B. The Modern Juvenile Court and the Emergence of the
Punitive Sanction
While for most of the twentieth century the rehabilitative ideal
influenced criminal law sentencing, in the 1970s various theorists
and legislatures de-emphasized rehabilitation as a penal goal and
74. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (holding civil
commitment proceedings are not "punitive" in purpose, and hence are not "criminal
cases" uniquely requiring "proof beyond a reasonable doubt"-proof by "clear and
convincing evidence" is sufficient in civil commitment matters). For a comprehensive
discussion of the variety of legal consequences of the punitive/nonpunitive
distinction, see generally J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and
Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379 (1976).
75. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-68 (1962).
76. Id. (holding that a state may require drug addict to undergo compulsory
treatment, but may not punish him for the status of drug addiction). See In re De La
0, 378 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1963) (holding that a confinement of petitioner for six months
to five years for a drug addiction constituted permissible "treatment and
rehabilitation" rather than impermissible "punishment" under Robinson).
77. "Criminal" law is distinguished from "civil" law by the former's imposition
of punishment. Professor George Fletcher explains: "The best candidate for a
conceptual proposition about the criminal law is that the infliction of 'punishment' is
sufficient to render a legal process criminal in nature." GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 408-09 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
78. See supra note 70.
79. See supra 48-49 and accompanying text.
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embraced retributive theory, supporting punishment as the vehicle
to afford offenders their "just deserts" and to deter crime.8 0 By the
mid-1980s roughly half the states had enacted determinate
sentencing laws, with several eliminating parole and some enacting
sentencing guidelines setting prison terms.8 1
This new retributive philosophy also infiltrated juvenile justice
as policy makers adopted "get tough" penalties on youthful offenders
in response to the perception of rapidly increasing juvenile crime.8 2
In the mid-1990s, virtually all states enacted measures facilitating
the transfer of more and younger youths to criminal court for
prosecution.8 3 Moreover, the traditional offender-oriented emphasis
of juvenile courts began to be joined, if not replaced, by retributive
and deterrence considerations reflected in the enactment of statutes
embodying determinate and mandatory minimum offense-based
sentencing.8 4
Some states, Washington in particular, enacted systems
explicitly aimed at providing "punishment commensurate with the
age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender" 8 5 in order
80. See generally Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution, supra note 49.
Professor Feld notes that in the 1970s determinate sentencing based on present
offense and prior record increasingly replaced indeterminate sentencing as "just
deserts" and retribution displaced rehabilitation as the underlying rationale for
criminal sentencing. Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal
Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 26 n.83 (2007)
[hereinafter Feld, Unmitigated Punishment].
81. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra note 80, at 26 n.83.
82. Id. at 25, 31; Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on
Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETICS &
PUB. POL'Y 323, 331 (1991).
83. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra note 80, at 31, 34, 40. Among the
states, the enhanced waiver policy took three forms: liberalizing the power of judges
to make waiver decisions; legislative exclusion of certain offenses from juvenile court
jurisdiction; and granting prosecutors discretion to "directly-file" certain cases in
criminal court. Id. at 38-39. See generally Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets
the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987); see also Forst & Blomquist, supra note 82, at
337-42 (discussing the various waiver procedures used to transfer juveniles into
adult criminal court).
84. As of 1988, about one-third of the states had employed offense-based
determinate sentencing in one form or another. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets ...
Punishment, supra note 44, at 851.
85. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2)(d) (West 2013). "In passing the
Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, Washington became the first state to enact a
[systematic] determinate sentencing statute for juvenile offenders." Forst &
Blomquist, supra note 82, at 343. See id. at 343-45, 346-49 for discussion of
California's enactment of a punitive approach. Kansas has adopted a system similar
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to, among other things, "[miake the juvenile offender accountable for
his or her criminal behavior."8 6 The Washington juvenile code
embodies a presumptive sentencing system in which dispositions are
determined by the youth's age, the offense committed, and the
history and seriousness of previous offenses.8 7 The direct purpose of
such provisions is not to promote the rehabilitative needs of the
offender, but rather to create an extensive sentencing system aimed
at holding juveniles accountable in proportion to their culpability,
thus imposing less severe dispositions than adult offenders
committing the same offense would receive in criminal court.88
The statutes of other states also now include offense-based
criteria with substantial sentences imposed on juvenile offenders
committing the most serious crimes and proportionally shorter
sentences for those committing less serious offenses.8 9 Some dictate
mandatory minimum terms of confinement based on the seriousness
of the offense, 90 while others retain indeterminate sentencing for
convicted delinquents generally, but mandate determinate
dispositions for repeat offenders or those committing certain serious
offenses. 91 These latter jurisdictions thus manifest pockets of
punitive juvenile justice within otherwise indeterminate, and
arguably rehabilitative, systems. The offense-oriented, determinate
sentencing movement constitutes a clear invocation of the punitive
sanction, 92 and stands in stark contrast to the offender-oriented,
indeterminate dispositional scheme reflected in traditional
rehabilitative juvenile justice .93
to Washington's. See In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008) for a discussion of the
Kansas model.
86. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.040.010(2)(c) (West 2013).
87. The Washington system is described in detail elsewhere. See Feld, The
Juvenile Court Meets... Punishment, supra note 44, at 843, 852-55; Walkover, supra
note 55, at 528-31. The ramifications of the right to rehabilitation, discussed infra
notesl56-84 and accompanying text, would impact the Washington system in
significant ways. See infra notes 307-12 and accompanying text.
88. Walkover, supra note 55, at 531.
89. See, e.g., Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets ... Punishment, supra note 44, at
859-60.
90. Id. at 862-63.
91. Id. at 863-71. For the impact the new rehabilitation right had on these
statutes, see infra notes 313-25 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text for a definition of
"punishment" for constitutional purposes.
93. See supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
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C. Punishment of Juveniles in Criminal Court
1. Judicial Waiver
Today most states continue to vest juvenile courts with exclusive
original jurisdiction over young people charged with acts of
delinquency.94 In these states, where waiver of jurisdiction to
criminal court is permitted, 95 the juvenile court judge conducts a
hearing96 and-using statutorily defined criteria-decides whether
94. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 15, at 53; BARRY C. FELD,
JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 221 (2014).
95. Most states require that the accused juvenile be over a certain age and
charged with a particularly serious offense before juvenile court jurisdiction may be
waived. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES supra note 15, at 224. However, some states
place no limitations on waiver, permitting waiver without regard to age or nature of
offense. Id. at 228.
96. The Supreme Court has required due process protections for juvenile
candidates for waiver to criminal court. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
Finding the loss of the rehabilitative protections of the juvenile court to be "critically
important" to the juvenile, the Kent Court required: a judicial hearing; assistance of
counsel; access to social investigations; and a record of the findings of the judge thus
enabling review by an appellate court. Id. at 553-54. The Kent Court also offered a
list of adequate substantive criteria for courts to employ when making waiver
decisions:
The determinative factors which will be considered by the Judge in deciding
whether the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction . . . will be waived are the
following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the
protection of the community requires waiver. 2. Whether the alleged offense
was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner. 3.
Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property,
greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal
injury resulted. 4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether
there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an
indictment (to be determined by consultation with the United States
Attorney). 5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in
one court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults
who will be charged with a crime in [adult criminal court]. 6. The
sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration
of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of
living. 7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous
contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies,
juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this
Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions. 8. The prospects for
adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable
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the case should be waived to criminal court.97 Waiver is generally
reserved for cases of serious criminality where repetitive misconduct
raises concerns for public safety or where the likelihood of
rehabilitation within the juvenile system is deemed unlikely.98
Waiver procedures often employ presumptions in favor of waiver
for certain designated serious offenses with the burden of proof
placed on the juvenile to establish why the juvenile court should
retain jurisdiction.9 9 Waiver hearings are conducted informally,100
and allow both the state and the juvenile to present evidence and
cross-examine the testimony and submissions of the other side. 101
Proceedings are initiated by the state filing a motion to "waive"
jurisdiction and-except in cases involving a presumption in favor of
waiving the case to criminal court-the state must carry the burden
of proof by either a preponderance of the evidence or clear and
convincing evidence, depending on the jurisdiction. 102 Generally,
state statutes dictate that the decision to waive is irrevocable.10 3
Because the focus of waiver hearings is at least in part directed
to the juvenile's amenability to rehabilitation, expert psychiatric
evidence and clinical evaluations are often considered by the
court.104 In making amenability decisions, courts consider the
clinical evidence in light of the juvenile's age and the time remaining
within juvenile court jurisdiction. 105 Thus older juveniles,
particularly those committing serious offenses, are prone to be
rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the alleged
offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available
to the Juvenile Court.
Id. at 566-67.
97, State statutes often incorporate the Kent criteria listed above, see supra
note 95; FELD, supra note 94, at 225.
98. Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer
Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99, 147 (2010). For a list of the waiver statutes from all the
states, see Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile's Right to Age-
Appropriate Sentencing, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 493-94 (2012).
99. FELD, supra note 94, at 227.
100. For example, strict evidentiary rules are not followed, with "informal-but-
reliable evidence" sometimes sufficing. FELD, supra note 94, at 229-31.
101. Id. at 229.
102. Id. at 229-30.
103. Id. at 230. However, some states require a juvenile to be returned to
juvenile court for disposition if he or she is convicted in criminal court of a lesser
included offense than that originally considered by the juvenile court. DAVIS, RIGHTS
OF JUVENILES supra note 15, at 240.
104. Id. at 232.
105. Id. at 234.
[Vol. 83:455
2016] LIMITATIONS ON THE PUNISHMENT OF JUVENILES 479
transferred to criminal court due to inadequate time for
rehabilitation within the juvenile system.106 Moreover, courts
routinely transfer juveniles to criminal court who have been
unsuccessful in prior rehabilitation interventions made available by
the state. 10 7
2. Legislative Exclusion
Statutes in the majority of states grant criminal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over youths of a certain age charged with certain
offenses-generally serious crimes committed by older juveniles. 108
Apart from considering age, the statutes focus on the crime charged
rather than the circumstances of the offender and thus foreclose
consideration of the juvenile's amenability to treatment through the
juvenile court. 109 Rejecting claims that a right to such treatment
exists, 110 courts have historically upheld legislative exclusion
statutes against constitutional attack. Il l Underlying such statutes is
the belief that youthful offenders committing serious crimes are not
amenable to rehabilitation, or even if they were, the costs of their
rehabilitation would be too expensive, thus diverting resources from
other more amenable juveniles within the juvenile system.1 12
Furthermore, the statutes reflect the perception that older juveniles
committing serious crimes deserve to be punished for their
offenses. 113
3. Prosecutorial Discretion: Direct File
A dozen or so jurisdictions grant prosecutors the authority to
decide whether to bring cases involving youthful offenders in either
juvenile or criminal court.11 4 In most concurrent jurisdiction states,
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 15, at 30; FELD, supra note 94, at
239.
109. FELD, supra note 94, at 243.
110. Id. at 239.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973). Bland is considered in detail infra notes 269-72, 268 and
accompanying text.
112. FELD, supra note 94, at 244.
113. Id.
114. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 15, at 38. See infra notes 284-85
and accompanying text.
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the statutes afford no guidelines, standards, or criteria,115 but simply
allow the prosecutor discretion to choose either juvenile or criminal
court. As with legislative exclusion, direct file statutes routinely
have been upheld, often with courts explicitly rejecting claims that
juveniles have constitutional rights to the rehabilitative auspices of
the juvenile court. 116
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S JUVENILE PUNISHMENT CASES AND THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO REHABILITATION
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has sometimes flirted
with the idea that young people enjoy the constitutional protections
afforded autonomous persons. 17At the same time, the Court has
often recognized that for some legal purposes children, even
adolescents, are sufficiently different from adults so as to justify
denials of autonomy and personhood rights.118  Because of a
perceived lack of mature competence, the Court has upheld
numerous state measures denying juveniles personhood rights in the
name of affording them protection, care, discipline, and guidance. 119
At no time, however, has the Court required that children be treated
differently from adults.120
That all changed in the Court's Eighth Amendment cases with
the Court's recognition of a categorical distinction between young
people and adults entitling juveniles to constitutional rights of
protection and care unavailable to adults. These cases-beginning
with capital punishment situations and moving to the context of life
imprisonment-are certain to impact juvenile law in significant
ways.
115. FELD, supra note 94, at 247.
116. Id. at 247-48; see infra notes 286-92 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (parents
have the liberty to "direct the upbringing and education of children" and to "direct
[their] destiny"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1944) (children,
unlike adults, have no First Amendment right to proselytize on public streets);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("Most children, even in adolescence, simply
are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their
need for medical care or treatment. Parents can and must make those judgments.").
See generally Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism,
Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights." 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.
605.
119. Supra note 118.
120. Guggenheim, supra note 98, at 486.
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A. The Death Penalty Cases
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,121 the Supreme Court planted the
seeds for its eventual conclusion that minors, specifically
adolescents, are a categorically distinct class from adults for
purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. The Thompson Court held that inflicting the
death penalty on offenders committing murder when fifteen-years-
old or younger constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In finding
that individuals that young are unable to act with sufficient
culpability to justify capital punishment, the Court referred to "the
experience of mankind" as evidence of the differences between young
people and adults, differences which must be recognized in
determining the rights and duties of juveniles and adults
respectively. 122 The Court noted "broad agreement" that adolescents
are "less mature and responsible than adults" while also being "more
vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults." 123
Thus, juvenile offenders are less culpable than adults committing
the same crime. Even though this conclusion was "too obvious to
require extended explanation,"1 24 the Court nevertheless explained:
"[inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the
teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct
while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated
by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult."'125 Interestingly,
the Court footnoted a host of social science data supporting its
conclusions about adolescents, but did not directly relate the studies
to its analysis. 126
However, the social science data referenced in Thompson burst
to the forefront in Roper v. Simmons, 127 which held that the Eighth
121. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). A four Justice plurality issued the opinion of the Court.
122. Id. at 824-25. Supporting its conclusion that adolescents are less culpable
than adults, the Court appealed to "evolving standards of decency" manifested by the
reluctance of state legislatures and juries to impose the death penalty on offenders
under age sixteen who committed capital crimes. Id. at 821-31.
123. Id. at 834 (quoting 1978 Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force
on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders as quoted in Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 115 n.ll (1982)).
124. Id. at 835.
125. Id.
126. "The ... decision in Thompson does not speak explicitly in the language of
adolescent development or support its arguments with scientific research on
adolescents' capacities." Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by
Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and
the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1013 (2003).
127. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). "Roper was the first time the Supreme Court applied
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Amendment prohibits execution of offenders who were under age
eighteen at the time they committed capital crimes. 128 The
infrequency of state imposition of the death penalty on juveniles, 129
along with empirical evidence suggesting differences between
adolescents and adults, convinced the Court that juveniles are
"categorically less culpable" than average adult offenders, 130 thus
immunizing them from the death penalty.
Appealing directly to empirical studies, the Court identified
three general characteristics of adolescents that differentiate them
from adults: (1) immaturity and underdeveloped awareness of
responsibility, manifesting itself in propensities to engage in
reckless behavior and impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions; (2) a vulnerability and susceptibility to negative influences
and outside pressures, including peer pressure; and (3) less
character development than adults with more transitory, and fewer
fixed, personality traits which enhance a minor's amenability to
rehabilitation. 131 Rejecting traditional arguments in favor of case-by-
psychological studies to the area of juvenile law." Samantha Schad, Adolescent
Decision-Making: Reduced Culpability in the Criminal Justice System and
Recognition of Complexity in Other Legal Contexts, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'y.
375, 388 n.124 (2011).
128. Between Thompson and Roper, the Court decided Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989), which upheld imposition of the death penalty for murderers who
were sixteen or seventeen-years-old at the time of their crimes. While the Court
recognized that juveniles are generally less culpable than adults, it rejected a
categorical ban on capital punishment favoring instead a case-by-case jury
assessment of whether particular offenders are sufficiently culpable to deserve
execution.
129. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-67. In reaching its conclusion, the Roper Court
applied a two-step test developed in earlier death penalty cases. The first inquiry
focuses on whether the punishment at issue is consistent with "evolving standards of
decency," indicated by "objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by
the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question." Id. at 563-64.
Applying this standard, the Court concluded that objective indicia of consensus in
the case--"the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the
infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the
trend toward abolition of the practice-provide sufficient evidence that today society
views juveniles," as "categorically less culpable than the average criminal." Id. at 567
(quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
The second inquiry of the two-part test allows the Court to exercise its "own
independent judgment." Id. at 564. In doing so, the Court appealed the "categorical"
differences between juveniles and adults, discussed infra notes 130-37 and
accompanying text, in concluding that juveniles lack sufficient culpability to merit
the death penalty.
130. Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
131. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
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case assessments in assessing culpability in administering the death
penalty, 132 the Court concluded: "The differences between juvenile
and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk
allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite
insufficient culpability." 133 In addition to culpability issues, the
Court emphasized that the transitory nature of adolescents'
character development rendered them uniquely amenable to
rehabilitation. Noting that "it would be misguided to equate the
failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility
exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed[,]' 134 the
Court gave voice to the notion that juvenile offenders might be
entitled to an opportunity to be rehabilitated.
In fashioning its categorical rule, the Court argued that fixing
the line for eligibility for the death penalty at age 18 was not an
arbitrary choice, 135 observing that in light of the transitory
personality development of adolescents, psychiatrists are forbidden
by rule from diagnosing any patient under age eighteen as having a
personality disorder. 136 Moreover, the "age of 18 is the point where
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and
adulthood."137
132. Id. at 572.
133. Id. at 572-73.
134. Id. at 570.
135. Justice O'Connor argued in her dissent that the relevant differences
between "adults" and "juveniles" are matters of degree rather than of kind:
Chronological age is not an unfailing measure of psychological development,
and common experience suggests that many 17-year-olds are more mature
than the average young "adult." In short, the class of offenders exempted
from capital punishment by today's decision is too broad and too diverse to
warrant a categorical prohibition.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 600-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 573.
137. Id. at 574. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia questioned the Court's
reliance on the social science evidence. In addition to raising questions about possible
methodological problems with the studies, Scalia cited the studies described above in
this Article, see supra note 13-for him contradicting the Court's conclusion that
adolescents lack the ability to take moral responsibility for their decisions-showing
that "by middle adolescence (age 14-15) young people develop abilities similar to
adults in reasoning about moral dilemmas, understanding social rules and laws, and
reasoning about interpersonal relationships and interpersonal problems." Id. at 617-
18 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing Brief for A-PA as Amicus Curiae, Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U. S. 417 (1990) (No. 88-805) at pp. 19-20) (citations omitted)). Scalia
also chided the Court for its categorical rule, claiming that the studies cited by the
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B. Mandatory Life Imprisonment Without Parole (LWOP)
1. Graham
Five years after Roper acknowledged the categorical distinction
between adolescents and adults, the Court reaffirmed that view in
Graham v. Florida,138 which invalidated as cruel unusual mandatory
LWOP sentences for offenders committing non-homicide crimes 139
when the offender was younger than 18.140 Citing Roper, the
Graham Court again declared that compared to adults juveniles
embody a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility; . . . are more . . . susceptible to negative influences
and outside pressures, including peer pressure; and their characters
are not as well formed."'14 1 The Court pointed out that these
conclusions had become even more firmly established since Roper,
noting that "developments in psychology and brain science continue
to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds."142 The Court again emphasized that juvenile offenders
Court offered "scant support" for a categorical prohibition, showing at most that "on
average . . . persons under 18 are unable to take moral responsibility for their
actions," and not that "all individuals under 18 are unable to appreciate the nature of
their crimes." Id. at 618. Scalia observed that "at least some minors will be mature
enough to make difficult decisions that involve moral considerations." Id. at 620. For
an argument that the social science sources relied on by the Roper Court were "too
scanty, vague, and dated," see Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of
Roper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379, 380 (2006).
138. 560 U.S. 48 (2011).
139. Graham, the juvenile involved in the case, was charged with attempted
robbery after a prosecutor elected to bring his case in criminal, rather than juvenile,
court. See supra note 114.
140. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 74 (2011). As with Roper's finding of a
national consensus against capital punishment of juvenile offenders, supra note 122,
the Graham Court found a similar consensus against sentencing juveniles to
mandatory life sentences. Graham, 560 U.S. at 62-67.
141. Id. at 68 (quoting Roper, internal citations omitted).
142. Id. at 68. Leading commentators agree with the soundness of the science
supporting the Court's conclusions. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old
Enough To Do the Crime, Too Young to Do the Time, 11 OHO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107,
108-121 (2013) (extensive review of the social science research) [hereinafter Feld,
Youth Discount]; Elizabeth S. Scott, "Children are Different" Constitutional Values
and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 85-87 (2013) (noting that the
differences between juveniles and adults are "verified through a solid and growing
body of research"); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX.
L. REV. 799, 801 (2003) (noting that the judgment of teens is "immature"); Elizabeth
S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW &
HUM. BEHAv. 221, 230 (1995) (noting that adolescents are uniquely susceptible to
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manifest a unique "capacity for change" which makes them "most...
receptive to rehabilitation," an impossibility in the context of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 143 This amenability
to rehabilitation, and to a lesser extent the limited culpability of
juveniles, convinced the Court that LWOP sentences for juveniles
committing non-homicide crimes are unconstitutionally severe. 14
At issue in Graham was a challenge to a "particular type of
sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have
committed a range of crimes."'145 The Court thus saw the need to
apply a "categorical approach" previously utilized only in capital
punishment cases, 146 and in so doing, rejected the longstanding view
that the death penalty is different in kind from other punishment
thus necessitating a rigorous Eighth Amendment approach
exempting certain categorical classes 147 such as juveniles 148 or the
mentally retarded from the death penalty. 149 Prior to Graham, the
peer pressure); Christopher Slobogin et al., A Prevention Model of Juvenile Justice:
The Promise of Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 185, 196
(research shows that "the average adolescent . . .differs from the average adult in
ways that diminish willingness to pay attention to the criminal law"); Elizabeth
Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1773, 1773-75 (1995) (documenting
propensity of adolescents to be influenced by peer pressure).
143. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
144. Id. "The idea that juveniles are capable of rehabilitation was central to the
Court's analysis in Graham." Sarah French Russell, Review for Release: Juvenile
Offenders, State Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, 378
(2014).
145. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61.
146. Id. at 61-62. See supra note 129. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice
Roberts agreed with the majority that "Roper's conclusion that juveniles are typically
less culpable than adults has pertinence beyond capital cases," but opposed a
categorical rule outside the death penalty context. Id. at 88-91 (Roberts, C.J.
concurring). Treating life sentences as analogous to capital punishment was, for
Roberts, "at odds with [the] longstanding view that 'the death penalty is different
from other punishments in kind rather than degree,"' Id.
147. In cases adopting categorical rules, the Court has taken the two-step
approach utilized in Roper. See supra note 129. The first consideration involves
determining whether a national consensus exists against the sentencing practice at
issue. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61. The second step requires the Court to exercise its own
understanding in light of controlling precedent and its interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's text, history, meaning and purpose. Id. The judicial exercise of
independent judgment also requires assessing the culpability of the offenders at
issue in light of their crimes and personal characteristics, along with the severity of
the punishment in question. Id. at 67.
148. See supra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
149. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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Court had always engaged in a more narrow proportionality analysis
in non-capital cases, one heavily differential to legislative
prerogative and finding excessive punishment only in "rare cases" of
"gross disproportionality" of a sentence for a particular crime, taking
into account circumstances of the particular offender. 150
In finding that mandatory LWOP constituted disproportionately
severe punishment for the class of non-homicide crimes involved, 15 1
the Court directed its focus to the characteristics of juvenile
offenders that-in light of traditional justifications for punishment-
immunize them from such from sentences. Retributive interests in
giving adult offenders their just desserts are less applicable to
juveniles, who by definition lack adult culpability. 152 Due to their
impetuous nature, juveniles are also less susceptible to deterrence
than their adult counterparts. 15 3 Moreover, confining juveniles for
life to incapacitate them from committing further crime is less
justifiable than similar dispositions for adults given that it "is
difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the
juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption," suggesting to the Court that "incorrigibility
is inconsistent with youth."154 Finally, the Court noted that
mandatory life sentences obviously preclude release upon
rehabilitation, a particularly cruel plight for juveniles given that
"[flrom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the
failings of a minor with those of an adult [in light of the] greater
possibility that [the] minor's character deficiencies will be
reformed."155
The Graham Court's repeated references to a juvenile's unique
amenability to reform grants constitutional status to an interest in
rehabilitation. 156 Recognizing rehabilitation as the basis of parole
150. Graham, 560 U.S. at 59-60, 88.
151. The Court compared the severity of mandatory life sentences to the death
penalty, noting that such sentences "alter the offender's life by a forfeiture that is
irrevocable," denying them "basic liberties without hope of restoration." Id. at 69-70.
Life without parole is also especially harsh for juveniles who on average end up
serving more years and a greater percentage of their lives in prison than adult
offenders. Id. at 70.
152. Id. at 71.
153. Id. at 72.
154. Id. at 73 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005); Workman v.
Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968)).
155. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68-69.
156. Id. at 73. Various commentators have viewed Graham as establishing, in
some sense, a constitutional "right to rehabilitation." See e.g., Arya, supra note 98, at
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systems, the Court declared in the language of constitutional
requirement: "What the State must do is to give [juveniles] some
meaningful, ['realistic'] opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." 157 Juvenile offenders
thus now have a right to demonstrate "maturity and reform," and
"should not be deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of
judgment and self-recognition of human worth and potential" outside
prison walls. 158
Such a conclusion does not mean that juveniles have a right to be
rehabilitated in the sense that they may never be confined for life. 159
Rather the view is that-at least in Graham's context of non-
homicide crimes-juveniles cannot be confined for life unless they
have a "meaningful opportunity" to be rehabilitated, successful
occurrence of which mandates parole. 160 Thus, at a minimum,
102 (Graham provides the "fodder" for "firmly establishing a constitutional right to
rehabilitation"); Meghan J. Ryan, Finality and Rehabilitation, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L.
& POL'Y. 121, 143-44 (2014) ("ignoring juveniles' potential for rehabilitation rendered
the punishments unconstitutional"). Aaron Sussman, The Paradox of Graham v.
Florida and Juvenile Justice System, 37 VT. L. REV. 381, 389 (2012) (Graham
establishes "the right to rehabilitative treatment" for juveniles). But see Feld, Youth
Discount, supra note 142, at 145 (Graham and Miller "rest firmly on retributive
grounds"); Guggeheim, supra note 98, at 490, 491 ("I do not... suggest that Graham
stands for the notion that juveniles have a constitutional right to rehabilitation"'-
Graham's "preeminent conclusion" is that "juveniles have lessened culpability than
most adults") (internal quote omitted). The author gives content to the right to
rehabilitation entailed in Graham. See infra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
157. Id. at 75, 82 (italics added).
158. Id. at 79.
159. The Court specified that its holding did not "require the State to release [all
offenders during their natural lives] as some juveniles who commit "truly horrifying
crimes may turn out to be irredeemable." Id. at 75. "The Eighth Amendment does not
foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed
before adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does forbid States from making
the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society."
Id.
160. The Court noted that the concept of rehabilitation is imprecise, making no
attempt to define what legally adequate rehabilitation programs would look like, but
instead left it for legislatures to determine appropriate and effective rehabilitative
techniques. Id. at 73, 74. However, termination of imprisonment must occur upon
rehabilitation. See infra note 209.
The opportunity for release through parole is the "logical inference" of
Graham. Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals Rehabilitation:
How State Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM.
L. 1, 30 (2011); Michelle Marquis, Graham v. Florida: A Game-Changing Victory for
Both Juveniles and Juvenile-Rights Advocates, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 255, 284 (2011)
(Graham requires sentencing statutes to include the possibility of parole for juveniles
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juveniles have an Eighth Amendment right to be free from a
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of
parole.
2. Miller
Shortly after Graham, the Court in Miller v. Alabama16' again
extended Eighth Amendment protection to juveniles by striking
down mandatory life sentences without parole imposed upon
offenders committing murder when under the age of 18 at the time
of their crimes. 162 Reemphasizing the Roper/Graham position that
"children are constitutionally different from adults for purpose of
sentencing," 163 the Court found that the social science supporting
those differences had become "even stronger."'164 The Court observed
that the logic of Graham was not limited to non-homicide cases,
noting that "none of what [Graham] said about children-about their
distinctive . . .mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities-is
crime specific" 165 and concluded that sentencing juveniles to
mandatory life without parole impermissibly precludes
considerations of the characteristics that make adolescents
unique. 166
In language inviting application to any and all juvenile
punishment, the Court quoted Graham: "criminal procedure laws
that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would
be flawed."'167 Noting that the mandatory penalty schemes at issue in
Miller prevented the sentencer from considering the offender's age,
thus running afoul of the fundamental principle of Roper/Graham,
the Court observed: "the imposition of a State's most severe
serving life sentences); Leslie Patrice Wallace, 'And I Don't Know Why It Is that You
Threw Your Life Away'" Abolishing Life Without Parole, The Supreme Court in
Graham v. Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance,
20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 64-76 (2010) (discussing requirement that states have
parole boards). Indeed, the Court has recognized that "parole is a regular part of the
rehabilitative process." Solem v. Helms, 463 U.S. 277, 300-01 (1991).
161. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
162. Id. at 2475. Statutes from Alabama and Arkansas were struck down in
Miller. Id.
163. Id. at 2464.
164. Id. at 2465 n.5. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
165. Id. at 2465.
166. Id. at 2468.
167. Id. at 2466 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010)).
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penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were
not children." 168
The Miller Court analogized life sentences to capital
punishment, imposition of which requires "individualized
sentencing" which takes into account mitigating factors, including
the offender's age, background, and mental and emotional
development. 169 Mandatory life sentences for a juvenile homicide
offender thus impermissibly preclude consideration
of his chronological age and its hallmark features-among
them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate
risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the
family and home environment that surrounds him-and from
which he cannot usually extricate himself-no matter how
brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the
homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in
the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may
have affected him .... [Finally] this mandatory punishment
disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the
circumstances most suggest it. 170
Failure to consider such factors before imposing the harshest
prison sentence creates "too great a risk of disproportionate
punishment."'171 The Court concluded, therefore, that the Eighth
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates LWOP for
juvenile offenders, 172 but declined to explicitly forbid all juvenile
LWOP sentences.173  The Court did predict, however, that
"appropriate occasions" for such sentences will be "uncommon" in
light of juveniles' diminished culpability and heightened capacity for
168. Id. at 2466. The Court viewed life imprisonment for juveniles as "akin to
the death penalty" by altering an offender's life by through a "forfeiture that is
irrevocable." Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300-01 (1983)).
169. Id. at 2467.
170. Id. at 2468. The Court rejected the argument that because many states
permitted mandatory LWOP sentences for some juveniles convicted of murder, no
finding of a national consensus against the practice could be made, suggesting that
such permission may instead be the inadvertent product of multiple independent
statutory provisions. Id. at 2470-72.
171. Id. at 2469.
172. Id. at 2469, 2471.
173. In dicta, the Court declared that its holding forbidding mandatory LWOP
was sufficient to decide Miller, therefore "we do not consider ... the argument that
the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for
juveniles." Id. at 2469.
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change.17 4 It thus appears, for the time being at least, that so long as
robust individualized pre-sentencing procedures are followed, LWOP
sentences are still allowed.
The Miller Court rejected the argument by the involved states
that the requirement for an "individualized sentencing" had been
satisfied by the juvenile court proceedings that waived the cases to
criminal court.17 5 Noting that at the early pretrial stage juvenile
courts have only partial information about the child and the
circumstances of the suspected offense, 176 the Court found the
waiver process further deficient because it did not always include
expert opinion by mental health professionals on behalf of the
juvenile.17 7 Perhaps more significantly, the Court focused on the
differences between the issues at stake in pretrial waiver hearings
and those at post-conviction sentencing in criminal court. Because
juvenile courts lose jurisdiction when offenders reach a particular
age, waiver decisions often present the choice of a disposition for a
brief period of time in the juvenile system or waiver to criminal court
where, prior to Miller, the juvenile could receive a mandatory
sentence of life without parole. 178 The Court easily imagined a
juvenile court judge deciding that a minor deserves a much higher
sentence than would be available in juvenile court while thinking
life-without-parole inappropriate.179 Therefore, the Court found that
judicial waiver hearings in juvenile court are inadequate vehicles to
assess relevant sentencing issues.
Adequate considerations are afforded, however, if juveniles
receive post-conviction discretionary sentencing in criminal court
where a judge or jury could choose, rather than a life-without-parole
prison sentence, "a lifetime prison term with the possibility of parole
or a lengthy term of years."1 80 Such a situation honors Graham's
requirement of a "meaningful opportunity" for the juvenile to show
that he or she has been rehabilitated.1 8 ' "By making youth (and all
that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of the harshest prison
sentence, [mandatory] scheme[s] pose[] too great a risk of
disproportionate punishment."''8 2
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2474; see supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
176. Id. at 2474.
177. Id. But see supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
178. Id. at 2474.
179. Id. at 2475.
180. Id. at 2474-75.
181. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). The Miller Court quoted
language from Graham. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
182. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
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Four Justices dissented in Miller.18 3 Criticizing the majority
opinion as implicitly providing "a way station on the path to further
judicial displacement of the legislative role in prescribing
appropriate punishment for crime," the dissenters saw "no
discernable end point" to the implications of Miller.18 4 Having cast
aside the possibility of limiting the Court's recognition of juveniles'
right to rehabilitation to the death penalty as in Roper, or to non-
homicide crimes in Graham, the dissent noted that the Miller
majority made no attempt to restrict the scope of its opinion.18 5
Indeed, the dissent noted that with its observation that "none of
what [Graham] said about children is 'crime specific,"' the majority
had extended the juvenile rehabilitation right principle to any and
all crimes, whatever their punishment. 18 6 Viewing the sole principle
underlying Miller to be "that because juveniles are different from
adults they must be sentenced differently," the dissenters declared:
There is no clear reason that principle would not bar all
mandatory sentences for juveniles, or any juvenile sentence
as harsh as what a similarly situated adult would receive.
Unless confined, the only stopping point for the Court's
analysis would be never permitting juvenile offenders to be
tried as adults.1 8 7
IV. DECIPHERING THE RIGHT TO REHABILITATION IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Reconciling Graham and Miller
Tension exists between Graham and Miller.1 88 Unless the cases
can be distinguished, Miller's failure to prohibit all juvenile LWOP
sentences is at odds with Graham's recognition of a right to parole
release upon rehabilitation.1 8 9 A distinction could seemingly rest
183. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito dissented. Id.
at 2477.
184. Id. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 2482.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Beth A. Colgan, Constitutional Line Drawing at the Intersection of
Childhood and Crime, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 79, 94 (2013) (Graham and Miller
provide "vastly different remedies, . . . fully categorical protection against a [LWOP]
sentence for non-homicide offenses [in Graham] and mere protection against
mandatory imposition of such sentences [in Miller]").
189. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The Miller Court, with a "cf." signal, cited
Graham's language requiring the State to provide "some meaningful opportunity to
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only on the basis of the different underlying offenses in the two
cases-non-homicide in Graham, homicide in Miller. Such a
distinction appears insignificant, however, in light of Miller's
observation that none of what Graham said about the distinct status
of juveniles is "crime specific." 190
Moreover, while Graham focused heavily on capability for
rehabilitation, Miller's requirement of an individualized pre-
sentence hearing emphasized front end culpability issues in setting
an appropriate sentence, paying virtually no attention to back end
issues requiring parole release should the juvenile's amenability to
rehabilitation be realized.191 These considerations might suggest
that juveniles are entitled to either an individualized pre-sentence
hearing or an opportunity for eventual parole release, but not to
both. As a prelude to examining this question, it should be noted
that numerous commentators have concluded that LWOP sentences
are now unconstitutional and will eventually be declared so by the
Court if they are not repealed by legislative action.192 Such
conclusions obviously imply that denial of the right to a meaningful
opportunity for rehabilitation through absence of parole release is
unconstitutional, whether or not a robust Miller pre-sentence
hearing is provided.
1. Parole Release in Lieu of an Individualized Pre-sentence Hearing
Carol and Jordan Steiker, argue that if the individualized
hearing required by Miller envisions the same "unbridled
consideration of mitigating evidence" mandated in capital cases,
such hearings will likely seldom occur.193 Rather than exploring
obtain [parole] release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Miller,
132 S. Ct. at 2469.
190. Id. at 2465. Graham, supra note 165 and accompanying text.
191. Id.; Scott, supra note 142, at 77. Miller focused on the reduced culpability of
juveniles, with its proportionality analysis supporting "a general mitigation
principle." See also infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text (Prof. Felds views).
On the other hand, Graham's emphasis was on juveniles' unique capacity for
rehabilitation. Supra note 143 and accompanying text.
192. See e.g., Colgan, supra note 188, at 96 (suggesting that the Court's remand
of a case imposing a discretionary LWOP indicates that the Court disfavors such
sentences); Richard S. Frase, What's 'Different" (Enough) in Eighth Amendment
Law? 11 OIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 10 (2013) (courts will most likely invalidate non-
mandatory LWOP sentences imposed on juveniles); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Miller v. Alabama: Is Death (Still) Different? 11 O1HO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 46
(2013) (the requirement of individualized sentences in the juvenile LWOP context
will likely end juvenile LWOP).
193. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 192, at 42-45. The authors observe that the
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"every aspect of a defendant's character and background" through
the expertise of mitigation specialists, mental health professionals,
and other "pertinent professionals,"' 9 4 the Steikers suggest that to
avoid such expense and complexity, "[s]tates will likely] choose to
forego LWOP in the juvenile context and opt out of 'individualized
sentencing' by simply tacking on parole eligibility to juvenile life
sentences." 95 For the Steikers, simply adding parole eligibility
would be a constitutionally permissible "simpler fix . . . rather than
attempting to inaugurate a new system of individualized
sentencing."1 9 6 Therefore, of the unique attributes of juveniles,
amenability to rehabilitation trumps lesser culpability as a matter of
constitutional significance.
This is not to minimize the significance of a pre-sentence hearing
as a forum affording individual offenders the opportunity to present
mitigating factors in their lives, which justify leniency in
determining of their sentences. 197 Pre-sentence consideration of such
mitigating factors is crucial because once a sentence is imposed,
culpability issues are settled and theoretically should not be
revisited. 98
circumstances the Court deemed relevant in Miller's case included:
[t]hat he was 'high on drugs' at the time of the offense, that his 'stepfather
physically abused him,' that his 'alcoholic and drug-addicted mother
neglected him,' that he had been 'in and out of foster care,' and that he had
attempted suicide four times, 'the first when he should have been in
kindergarten.' [The Court] concludes that the sentence in Miller's case
"needed to examine all these circumstances before concluding that life
without possibility of parole was the appropriate penalty."
Id. at 44.
194. Id. at 43.
195. Id. at 45.
196. Id. at 48.
197. Supra note 191 and accompanying text.
198. "Miller's ban on mandatory LWOP .. . assumes that judges and juries can
be trusted to individualize at the time of sentencing and to forecast whether a
juvenile killer must remain in prison for life." Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos
Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment, 112 MICH. L. REV. 397, 417 (2013).
While culpability issues are theoretically finalized at sentencing, some parole boards
do ill-advisedly consider an inmate's culpability in making parole decisions. As
Professor Russell states: "The severity of the crime is taken into account in
determining the original sentence-including the date for parole eligibility. Under
Graham and Miller, crime severity should not influence an assessment of release
suitability." Russell, supra note 144, at 413. However, historically parole boards have
factored in crime severity, often as a bases for parole denial in cases of violent
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2. Individualized Pre-sentence Hearing in Lieu of Parole
Unlike the Steikers, Barry Feld takes the position that the
culpability factor predominates, claiming that Graham/Miller are
satisfied so long as the minimal culpability of juveniles is
accommodated. "Rather than require judges to provide some
'meaningful opportunity to obtain release' or to grapple with 'the
mitigating qualities of youth,' state legislatures should use age as a
proxy for reduced culpability and provide substantial reductions in
sentence lengths."199 Arguing that the "reduced culpability that
precludes the death penalty for juvenile offenders is just as
diminished for other sentences, 200 Professor Feld proposes a "youth
discount" to apply to any and all punishment imposed on youthful
offenders. 201
Feld pays virtually no attention to the rehabilitative amenability
factor articulated in Roper/Graham/Miller,2 2 and instead sees the
cases as "rest[ing] firmly" on retributive-reduced culpability-
grounds. 203 For him, the demands of these cases are satisfied so long
offenses. Id. at 397.
199. Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW
& INEQ. 263, 264-65 (2013) [hereinafter Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility].
200. Feld, The Youth Discount, supra note 142, at 122.
201. Feld justifies his position by noting that Miller provided no practical
guidance as to how to incorporate mitigating qualities of youth into sentencing
decisions. Id. at 136. He observes that states are already "scrambling" to revise
sentencing laws to convert mandatory LWOP statutes to life with the possibility of
parole or to impose minimum terms of years. Seeing such measures as inadequately
accounting for the lesser culpability of youth, he argues:
Rather than try to weigh the role of youthfulness on a discretionary basis,
states should formally incorporate an offender's age as a mitigating factor
in sentencing statutes. The Court's jurisprudence of youth recognizes that
juveniles who produce the same harms as adults are not their moral equals
and do not deserve the same consequences for their immature decisions.
Roper, Graham, and Miller ... endorse youthfulness as a mitigating factor
that applies to capital and non-capital sentences.
Id. at 137.
202. Without explanation, Feld does say that "states should provide [juveniles]
with resources [enabling] them to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation." Feld,
Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, supra note 199, at 329.
203. Feld, The Youth Discount, supra note 142, at 145.
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as juveniles receive substantially less severe penalties than those
imposed on adults committing the same crime.204
3. Both Parole Release and an Individualized Pre-Sentence Hearing
Rather than either parole release or individualized
presentencing hearings, the best reading of RoperlGrahamlMiller
requires both. If the cases indeed establish a right to an opportunity
for rehabilitation, then parole upon rehabilitation is clearly
mandatory. Given the Court's acknowledgment of the pre-sentence
impossibility of precisely distinguishing those juveniles whose
crimes are one-time products 20 5 of "transient immaturity" and those
"rare [offenders] whose crimels] reflect irreparable corruption, 206
rehabilitation programs within prison207 with parole release are
necessary to effectuate a youthful offender's right to a "meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation."208 Moreover, because rehabilitation can occur at any
time and requires immediate release from prison upon its
occurrence, 209 it follows that mandatory minimum sentences can no
204. Professor Feld's system would give the largest sentence reductions to the
youngest, least mature offenders based on a sliding scale of diminished
responsibility, with fourteen-year-olds receiving no more than twenty or twenty-five
percent the length of an adult sentence. Id. at 141. Mid-adolescents could receive no
more than half the adult length. Id. at 142. Because the length of an LWOP is
indeterminate, states should apply a youth discount to a presumptive life sentence
length of about forty years. Id. at 142 n. 163.
205. Some see criminal conduct as a "normal aspect of teen life," especially for
males, which is usually not repeated upon reaching adulthood. Scott & Grisso, supra
note 59, at 154 (quoting Terrie Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited and Life Course Persistent
Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 675
(1993)). Professor Scott elaborates:
[Miany studies find a . . . pattern of adolescent offending, with the
aggregate level of criminal involvement beginning at about age thirteen and
increasing until age seventeen, followed by a sharp decline. This age-crime
trajectory confirms the transitory nature of most adolescent offending and
supports the Courts judgment that juveniles are more likely to reform than
their adult counterparts.
Scott, supra note 142, at 87.
206. Graham, supra note 154 and accompanying text.
207. For what such programs might look like, see infra note 227.
208. Graham, supra note 157 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 44. In discussing the inconsistency of mandatory minimum
sentences within a rehabilitative model, one court noted that if "at any time" during
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longer be imposed on juvenile offenders if Graham is followed to its
logical conclusions.
Supposing scaled-down sentences are legislatively enacted as an
accommodation to the diminished culpability of juveniles, Miller
hearings would still be required even if the juvenile has arrived in
criminal court as a consequence of a judicial waiver hearing in
juvenile court.210 The Miller Court found that waiver hearings lack
the rigor of a thorough and effective individualized inquiry into the
culpability and rehabilitative amenability of the juvenile offender. 211
While Miller's main focus was directed to considerations of
retributive justice in accommodating the diminished culpability of
juveniles, the Court did note that another purpose of such hearings
is to address "the possibility of rehabilitation."212 This suggests-
again, in light of the acknowledged difficulty in accurately assessing
rehabilitative amenability at the pre-sentencing stage-that no
juvenile, not even ones deemed not amenable to rehabilitation, can
be given a punitive sentence where no meaningful and realistic
prospect of rehabilitation exists. This is true even if a juvenile court
judge has also previously found the juvenile not amenable to
rehabilitation. Where, however, a prison sentence with a parole
release mechanism does present a realistic opportunity for
rehabilitation, 213 such sentence could permissibly be imposed.
The situation is arguably different, however, in cases where the
criminal court judge concludes in a Miller hearing that a juvenile is
amenable to rehabilitation. Here, the juvenile may well be a fit
candidate for rehabilitation in the juvenile system, even if a juvenile
court judge, in transferring the case to criminal court, has previously
found the juvenile not amenable to rehabilitation. 214 This is
a rehabilitative placement, a juvenile offender is "successfully rehabilitated, he [is]
entitled to release." In re Felder, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528, 533 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1978) (finding
mandatory dispositions based on crime seriousness to constitute "punishment" for
purposes of determining jury trial rights).
210. See supra notes 94-98, 104-107 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 177-181 and accompanying text.
212. See note 170 and accompanying text (the discussion of Miller).
213. For questions about how likely this opportunity is in present prison
settings, see supra note 49; infra note 243 and accompanying text.
214. There are several reasons why the criminal court in a post-conviction Miller
hearing might be better able to make an accurate assessment of amenability to
rehabilitation than was the juvenile court judge at the pretrial waiver hearing. The
judge in a post-conviction Miller hearing has access to more information than did the
juvenile court judge who acted on "only partial information at [the] early, pretrial
stage about either the child or the circumstances of [the suspected] offense." See
supra note 178 and accompanying text. The trial evidence, while justifying a guilty
verdict may also reveal aspects of the offender's circumstances which support a
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particularly true in cases of younger offenders who will not soon
reach termination age for juvenile court jurisdiction. In such
situations, a rehabilitative disposition in juvenile court would be
appropriate, and arguably required, and could be effectuated
through a "blended sentencing" mechanism which would allow the
criminal court judge to impose a juvenile court disposition either in
lieu of a criminal sentence, or to stay a criminal sentence pending
successful completion of a commitment to the juvenile system. 2 15 If
such disposition presents the best opportunity for rehabilitation,
justifying its denial would be difficult in light of the Court's
recognition of the rehabilitative amenability of juvenile offenders.
B. The Right to Rehabilitation-Beyond LWOP
Clearly the "Court has broken new ground" in its attempt in
RoperlGraham/Miller to "decipher [through social science] the young
minds of those who disobey the law."2 16 As the Miller dissenters
correctly note, there is no principled reason to limit the Court's
conclusions regarding the inherent nature of young people to the
context of LWOP sentences. 217 As Professor Feld accurately
observes, "the reduced culpability that precludes the death penalty
conclusion that the offender is amenable to rehabilitation, contrary to the earlier
conclusion of the juvenile court judge's juvenile court judge at the waiver proceeding.
Moreover, the judge in the Miller hearing may have richer access to the expertise of
mental health and other professionals than did to the juvenile court, thus enhancing
the possibilities of a more informed assessment of the offender's prospects for
successful rehabilitation. Supra note 179.
Transferring judicially-waived cases back to juvenile court from criminal
court would require changes in current law. Presently, transfer from criminal to
juvenile court is possible only in cases originating in criminal court in legislative
exclusion and direct file situations, and not ones involving judicial waivers. See THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 824 (Barry C. Feld
& Donna M. Bishop eds.) (2012).
215. For a discussion of blended sentencing, see DAVIS, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS,
supra note 54, at 391-93. The American Law Institute's revised Model Penal Code
(MPC) sentencing provisions require that juvenile offenders' age is to be presumed a
mitigating factor and that criminal court judges should have authority to impose any
disposition that would have been available had the offender been adjudicated for the
same conduct in juvenile court. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.11A(d). Alternatively, the
court may impose a juvenile-court disposition while reserving the possibility of
imposing an adult criminal sentence if the offender fails to comply with the
conditions of the juvenile-court disposition. Id.
216. Denno, supra note 137, at 384.
217. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
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for juvenile offenders is just as diminished for other sentences" 218
whether they be sentences of life or for any shorter term. Therefore,
the Miller dissenters again appear correct in concluding that any
and all juvenile sentences must now be less severe than those
imposed on similarly-situated adults, 219 thus requiring something
like Feld's "youth discount." By the same token, if juvenile offenders
are indeed uniquely amenable to rehabilitation, they are so
regardless of the offense committed or the possible punishment. The
Court's cases thus clearly imply that all juvenile offenders have a
right to a disposition presenting a realistic, meaningful opportunity
for rehabilitation.
While punishment can take many forms-fines and house arrest
for example-punishment in the form of incarceration was the
subject of the Graham and Miller Courts. Therefore, the
rehabilitation right entailed in those cases may be limited to
contexts where imprisonment is the form of punishment at stake. In
any event, my discussion of the right throughout the remainder of
this Article assumes situations where juveniles face the possibility of
punitive imprisonment. As will be demonstrated in Part V, the above
description of the rehabilitation right is equally applicable to
juvenile, as well as criminal, court dispensations of punishment.
It is, of course, impossible to predict whether the Court will
impose the full array of reforms entailed in Graham /Miller 220 as
spelled out above. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the requirements
of an individualized pre-sentence hearing and parole upon successful
rehabilitation described in the context of LWOP sentences 221 also
218. Supra note 200 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. While the Graham Court
implied that juvenile LWOP sentences are unique as the "second most severe
penalty," Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010). Justice Thomas correctly notes
that "no reliable limiting principle remains to prevent the Court from immunizing
juvenile offenders from the law's third, fourth, fifth or fiftieth most severe penalties
as well." Id. at 103, (Thomas, J., dissenting). One commentator made the point this
way: "The complexities of childhood exist no matter the crime of conviction." Colgan,
supra note 190, at 95.
220. "The Court has broken new ground and announced a constitutional
principle with potentially far reaching implications: 'children are different.' At this
point it is not clear whether the Court will apply the principle to further enhance
juveniles' special constitutional status." Scott, supra note 142, at 105. I have
previously argued for extension of the "children are different" concept beyond the
context of juvenile punishment. See Martin R. Gardner, The Categorical Distinction
Between Adolescents and Adults: The Supreme Court's Juvenile Punishment Case-
Constitutional Implications for Regulating Teenage Sexual Activity, 28 BYU J. PUB.
L. 1 (2013).
221. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
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logically extend to all juvenile sentencing contexts.222 Thus, all
juveniles now appear entitled to indeterminate sentences as noted
by the Miller dissenters. 223 However, the dissenters mistakenly
222. As one commentator put it: "[The Roper, Graham, and Miller cases] carve
out a clear message. Young people, even those who have committed serious crimes,
are capable of change. This capacity demands individualized consideration at
sentencing and throughout the course of incarceration." Laura Cohen, Freedom's
Road: Youth, Parole, and the Promise of Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida,
35 CARDOzo L. REV. 1031, 1055 (2014). For an illustration of how these principles
apply to juvenile court sentencing, see infra text Part V.
Some courts agree. See, e.g., State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 74-76 (Iowa
2013) (state constitution requires trial courts to apply the "core teaching" of Roper,
Graham and Miller in making sentencing decision for long prison terms-here 52.5
years in prison before parole eligibility-involving juveniles); State v. Pearson, 836
N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 2013) (individualized Miller hearing required when juvenile
received a 35 year mandatory minimum sentence); State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378,
402 (Iowa 2014) (reasoning of Miller applies even to "short" mandatory sentences-
here 7 years-thus requiring sentencing court to "craft] punishment that serves the
best interests of the child and of society").
Other courts have, however, limited Graham and Miller to situations of
mandatory LWOP, see, e.g., Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 550-51 (6th Cir. 2012),
cert. denied 569 U.S. - (2013) (Graham limited to LWOP and arguably does not
extend to lengthy sentences amounting to the "practical equivalent" of LWOP). Still
other courts have extended Graham and Miller to sentences technically not LWOP
but with parole eligibility dates that fall outside the juvenile offender's natural life
expectancy. See, e.g., People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) (sentence of
110 years to life constituted cruel and unusual punishment). See also People v.
Pacheco, 991 N.E.2d 896, 907 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (20-year minimum sentence "does
not compare" to LWOP); State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 262-65 (Minn. 2014) (life
sentence with possibility of release after 30 years is "not tantamount" to LWOP).
223. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. By declaring that juveniles can
no longer be given "mandatory sentences," I assume the Justices meant that
indeterminate sentencing must now be employed. While apparently no court has yet
explicitly so held, the Iowa Supreme Court has entertained the possibility. In holding
that even "short" mandatory minimum sentences are impermissible under Miller,
the court observed:
Because our holding focuses exclusively on a statutory schema that requires
a district court to impose a sentence containing a minimum period of time a
juvenile must serve before becoming eligible for parole and that denies a
district court the discretion to impose a lesser sentence, we do not consider
the situation in which a district court imposes a sentence that denies the
juvenile the opportunity for parole in the absence of a statute requiring
such a result. Accordingly, we do not determine whether such a sentence
would be constitutional.
Lyle, 824 N.W.2d at 401 n.7.
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conclude that the "only stopping point" for the Miller analysis is that
juveniles can never be tried as adults, if, by that, they mean that
juveniles can never be tried in criminal court.224 There is nothing in
the Court's cases that precludes juveniles being tried in adult
criminal court so long as they receive rigorous pre-sentence hearings
and indeterminate sentences 225-less severe than those imposed on
adults committing the same crime-with parole upon
rehabilitation.2 26
How the mechanics of the hearing procedures and the juvenile
parole requirements could be effectuated is a complicated matter2 27
224. Id. This view is embraced by some commentators. See, e.g., infra note 226.
225. "Indeterminate sentences" are those with no mandatory minimum prison
terms. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. I argue in Part V that a judicial
waiver hearing in juvenile court is a constitutional precondition to assertion of
criminal court jurisdiction over any juvenile accused of committing criminal offenses.
See infra notes 231-66 and accompanying text.
226. Thus, Neelum Arya erroneously views decisions to transfer juveniles to
criminal court as themselves cruel and unusual punishment because of the "lifelong
impact of a criminal court conviction" and because "available evidence indicates that
[transfer laws] . . . are counterproductive." Arya, supra note 98, at 138, 142 (internal
quotes omitted). In arguing that transfer decisions are "punishment and not merely
... jurisdictional [matters]," Id. at 138. Arya pays insufficient attention to the
concept of punishment, see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text, the presence of
which is necessary for Eighth Amendment applicability. See supra notes 22-23 and
accompanying text. Transfer decisions serve the non-punitive, administrative
purpose of making a criminal trial possible with punishment a possible future
consequence. These decisions thus function the same way as such things as police
arrests, pretrial detention, and preliminary hearings function within the criminal
justice system. While such restraints on liberty may be unpleasant to their
recipients, they constitute non-punitive precursors to possible future punishment.
For an analysis demonstrating the non-punitive nature of police arrests and pretrial
detention, see Gardner, Rethinking, supra note 36, at 452-58 (2008).
227. Professor Feld notes some of the complexities:
Graham . . . required states to provide them with "some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation." but did not define states' responsibility to provide youths
with resources with which to change or identify when they would become
eligible for parole. Does a "meaningful opportunity" to change require states
to provide rehabilitative programs? Would a first parole release hearing in
forty years provide "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release"?
Feld, Youth Discount supra note 142 at 135 (footnotes omitted).
For some of the problems involved in implementing the hearing
requirement, see Steiker & Steiker, supra note 192, at 42-47. As possible ways to
usefully implement the hearing and parole release requirements, consider the
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following recommendations:
A. Sentencing and Institutional Reform
" Eliminate all true and de facto juvenile LWOP sentences.
* Amend sentencing statutes to create differential sentencing schemes
for youth tried in the adult system, including shorter . .. terms than
those faced by adults, and compel courts to consider and weigh
defendants' ages and developmental status both at the time they
committed their offenses and at sentencing.
* For youth serving indeterminate sentences, create presumptions in
favor of release upon completion of minimum terms, if current
dangerousness is not established.
* Increase available prison programming-including mental health,
substance abuse, educational, vocational, release-preparation, and re-
entry programs-for adolescent and young adult inmates.
* Create post-conviction victim-offender mediation or education
programs for inmates sentenced as adolescents.
B. Parole Process
* Require parole board members who hear cases involving inmates
convicted as minors to have expertise in adolescent development and
the nexus between developmental science and juvenile offending.
* Require parole board members to receive training in the causes and
frequency - of juvenile wrongful convictions, and to take these
considerations into account, when appropriate, in evaluating inmates
who were convicted as adolescents for parole.
* Require annual parole reviews once youth have served ... [defined]
terms of incarceration.
* Require parole boards to consider and afford weight to prospective
parolees' age and developmental status at the time of offense and
conviction.
* Ensure that actuarial risk assessment instruments are validated for
adolescents in adult systems, and require pre-parole clinical interviews
as well as actuarial assessments for this population.
* Provide access to counsel at parole hearings and on appeal from
denials of parole for inmates convicted as adolescents.
C. Judicial Review
* Create new mechanisms for post-conviction review of adolescent
sentences (including, for example, judicial early release procedures
similar to those that exist in some juvenile courts).
* Enact less deferential standards of judicial review of parole board
determinations.
Cohen, supra note 222, at 1087-88.
See also Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 198, at 450-51 arguing for "parole
juries"; Green, supra note 160, at 30-38 (describing "a separately created prison
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which the Court has left up to state policymakers to work out.228 I
have made no attempt here to examine how such matters could or
should be implemented. Instead, I have attempted to flesh out the
meaning of the individual constitutional rights entailed in the
Court's Eighth Amendment juvenile cases, leaving it to others to
translate those principles to practical, structural reforms. 229
V. JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IMPLICATIONS
In this Part, I consider the impact on juvenile justice systems
should the rehabilitation right be extended to its logical conclusions.
That impact would be significant in four ways: 1) a rehabilitative
juvenile justice system is now constitutionally mandated;23 0 2) the
waiver standards in most, if not all, jurisdictions are now
constitutionally inadequate; 3) judicial hearings in juvenile court are
now constitutionally required as prerequisites to any possible trial in
criminal court, thus making legislative exclusion and direct file
statutes unconstitutional; and 4) punishment of juveniles within the
juvenile system must now be governed by the same pre-sentence
hearing and parole release requirements discussed above in the
context of criminal court punishment.
A. Juvenile Courts as Constitutionally Mandated
With the recent movement towards punishment within the
juvenile justice system, 231 Barry Feld and others have argued that
juvenile courts should be abolished. 232 As they become increasingly
release model for juvenile life sentence offenders"); Marquis, supra note 160, at 282-
86 (describing state parole requirements for complying with Graham); Russell, supra
note 143 (detailing: 1) a chance for release at a meaningful point in time; 2)
provisions promoting a realistic likelihood of release for the rehabilitated; and 3)
measures assuring a meaningful opportunity to be heard).
228. Supra note 160 and accompanying text.
229. See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 198, at 436.
230. Some leading commentators have long urged abolishing the juvenile justice
system. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
232. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 44; NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, THE
RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 106-07 (1971); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imaging Childhood
and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69
N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991) [hereinafter Abolishing the Juvenile Court]; Janet E.
Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court
Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927 (1995) [hereinafter Youth Justice]; Katherine Hunt
Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the Preservation of
Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23 (1990); Sanford J. Fox, Abolishing the
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punitive, in some places juvenile courts have become
indistinguishable from their adult criminal counterparts, thus
calling into serious question the rationale for continuing a separate
juvenile system. 233 Hence, juvenile court abolitionists argue for doing
away with the juvenile system so long as criminal courts impose
scaled-down punishments to accommodate the diminished
culpability of juveniles.234
While some have responded to the abolitionists with a variety of
policy considerations supporting retention of the juvenile court
system, 235 the implications of the newly-recognized rehabilitation
Juvenile Court, 28 HARV. L. SCH. BuLL. 22 (1977); Francis Barry McCarthy,
Delinquency Dispositions Under the Juvenile Justice Standards: The Consequences of
a Change of Rationale, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1093 (1977); Stephen Wizner & Mary F.
Keller, The Penal Model of Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile Court Delinquency
Jurisdiction Obsolete?, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1120 (1977).
233. In language no longer defensible in light of the Supreme Court's recent
recognition of the unique status of children, Janet Ainsworth argued that the
movement towards punitive juvenile justice manifests a recognition that the sharp
child-adult dichotomy assumed by the originators of the juvenile court movement has
broken down. Adolescents are viewed more as a subclass of adults than as a subclass
of child. Ainsworth, Youth Justice, supra note 232, at 931-41. If adolescents are not
"essentially" different from adults, "[tjhe continued existence of a separate juvenile
court system [is] difficult . . . to sustain." Id. at 936. "With its philosophical
underpinnings no longer consonant with the current social construction of childhood,
the juvenile court now lacks a rationale for its continued existence other than sheer
institutional inertia." Ainsworth, Abolishing the Juvenile Court, supra note 232, at
1118. Barry Feld agrees: "[O]nce a state separates social welfare from criminal social
control, no role remains for a separate juvenile court for delinquency matters." Feld,
Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 232, at 69.
234. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 232.
235. For example, Professor Irene Rosenberg argues against "[a]bandoning the
juvenile court [as] an admission that its humane purposes were misguided or
unattainable.... We should stay and fight.., for a reordering of societal resources
... that will protect and nourish children." Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad
Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 163,
184. She further argues:
Despite all their failings . . . the juvenile courts do afford benefits that are
unlikely to be replicated in the criminal courts, such as the institutionalized
intake diversionary system, anonymity, diminished stigma, shorter
sentences, and recognition of rehabilitation as a viable goal. We should
build on these strengths rather than abandon ship.
Id. at 184-85 (footnotes omitted). For a similar argument favoring separate juvenile
and criminal systems, see Martin L. Forst & Matha-Elin Bloomquist, Cracking Down
on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L.
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right now provide a powerful constitutional argument against
juvenile court abolition.236 In short, juvenile offenders now appear to
have a constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity for
rehabilitation which translates to a prima facie right to have their
cases originate in a forum dispensing rehabilitation rather than
punishment. Under present circumstances, that forum is the
juvenile court, which would now be required to exercise jurisdiction
over all juvenile offenders except those whose danger to the public or
nonamendability to rehabilitation disposition is sufficiently strong to
override the presumption of juvenile court disposition. 23 7
As one commentator has argued, after Graham "[l]awyers may
... create successful arguments that juveniles have a substantive
right to juvenile treatment if they are able to pair arguments based
on the right to rehabilitation with empirical data showing that
treatment available within the juvenile system is the only realistic
way for the youth to achieve that rehabilitation." 238 Such data
exists. 239
1. Juvenile Courts as Best Rehabilitative Alternative for
Youthful Offenders
Although juvenile systems have become increasingly punitive,
none has abandoned rehabilitation as an important goal.240 State
statutes continue to manifest an ongoing commitment to the
rehabilitation and treatment of children by mandating dispositions
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323, 335-36, 359-69 (1991).
236. For Professor Scott, the mitigation of culpability recognized by the Roper,
Graham, and Miller also provides a rationale for "retaining most juveniles in a
separate justice system that systematically deals with offenders within its
jurisdiction more leniently than does the criminal justice system." Scott, supra note
142, at 98.
237.
While all youth, even those charged with the most heinous of offenses, are
amenable to rehabilitation, the fact remains that there may always be a
very small, discrete number of youth who remain a danger to the public....
[W]e will need a safety net for the public that operates after the juvenile
justice system has failed, rather than before youth are given an opportunity
to change.
Arya, supra note 98, at 155.
238. Id. at 152.
239. See infra text and notes 242-254.
240. Kristin Henning, What's Wrong with Victim's Rights in Juvenile Court? 97
CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1119 (2009).
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that promote the best interest of juveniles through state services
aimed at making them productive citizens. While the juvenile
system has not been widely successful in dispensing effective
rehabilitation, 24 1 some commentators are optimistic that meaningful
treatment can occur within the system. 242 Moreover, it is clear that
the criminal justice system is no better and probably worse. In fact,
the Supreme Court recently cited congressional findings that the
federal prison system's "attempt to 'achieve rehabilitation of
offenders [has] failed."' 243 On balance, it is likely that rehabilitative
benefits are more forthcoming from the present juvenile system
241. Id. Clearly, not all juvenile offenders emerge from rehabilitative programs
as "productive citizens." As Professor Feld notes, while numerous studies of the
efficacy of juvenile correctional have been conducted, "[flew have encouraged
proponents of rehabilitation." Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between
Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency in Juvenile
Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1118 n.18 (2003). The Supreme Court itself
expressed doubt about whether young people subjected to juvenile court jurisdiction
in fact received the "solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children." Kent, 383 U.S. at 556; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17, 18, (1967) ("the results of
the juvenile system have not been entirely satisfactory").
242. See, e.g., Kim Taylor-Thompson, Minority Rule: Redefining the Age of
Criminality, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 143, 194-98 (2014) (praising the
rehabilitative efforts of the "Missouri Model"); Feld, supra note 241 (citing Lipsey &
Wilson as a source describing characteristics of successful treatment programs for
serious juvenile offenders); see also Christopher Slobogin, Treating Kids Right:
Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Amenability to Treatment Concept, 10 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 299, 315-16 (1999) (identifying the three attributes of
juvenile treatment programs most likely to "work" in reducing recidivism). Some
even make the modest claim that widespread rehabilitative success is not necessary
to satisfy the juveniles' right to an initial rehabilitative disposition:
To comply with Graham, involvement in the juvenile justice system must
not impede a child's rehabilitation . . . [P]olicies that make it more difficult
for a child to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation than it would be
without system involvement do not constitute a meaningful opportunity,
and thus do not comply with Graham.
Sussman, supra note 156, at 386-87.
Although the Supreme Court has been pessimistic about the effectiveness of
the juvenile courts in delivering effective rehabilitation, see supra note 241, the
Court never completely gave up on the ability of the system to achieve its purposes.
A plurality of the Court stated that they were "reluctant to say that, despite
disappointments of grave dimensions, [the juvenile system] still does not hold
promise." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
243. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2082, 2087 (2011) (quoting Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989)).
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administered by court personnel experienced in working with young
people. 244
Furthermore, it is well established that stigmatizing offenders
often hinders their prospects for rehabilitation. 245 Because the
consequences of conviction in juvenile courts are likely less stigmatic
than those attending convictions in criminal courts,246 retaining a
244. Leading commentators argue:
The most effective means to implement the lessons from developmental
psychology is to maintain a system of adjudication and disposition that is
separate from the adult criminal justice system. First, a juvenile court can
better recognize and accommodate the reduced culpability and more limited
trial competence of younger offenders. Moreover, a separate juvenile
correctional system is more likely to utilize dispositional strategies, goals,
and approaches that are grounded in developmental knowledge. ... The
ability or inclination of the criminal justice system to tailor its response to
juvenile crime so as to utilize the lessons of developmental psychology is
questionable. The evidence suggests that political pressure functions as a
one-way ratchet, in the direction of ever-stiffer penalties. Programs
designed for adolescents and sentencing distinctions between adults and
juveniles will be much harder to maintain in a unified system in which
juveniles are otherwise treated as adults; it seems predictable that the lines
between age groups will become blurred.
Scott & Grisso, supra note 59, at 188-89.
Finally, evidence suggests that "approximately 34%" of juveniles
transferred to criminal court are more likely to recidivate than similarly situated
juveniles retained in juvenile court. Arya, supra note 98, at 141 (citing studies).
245. See, e.g., Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 1
(2003) (a criminal record presents a major barrier to employment); Richard D.
Schwartz & Jerome Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOC. PROBS. 133
(1962); Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39
J.L. & ECON. 519 (1996) (discussing ways in which convicted criminals suffer stigma
manifested through the reluctance of others to interact with them economically and
socially).
246. In discussing why separate juvenile courts should be retained, even ones
dispensing punishment, one commentator observed:
If shorter sentences were all that were involved, there would be no need for
a separate juvenile court; criminal court judges could simply take a
juvenile's age into account in setting the sentence. But more is involved.
Juveniles' capacity for change means that less stigma should be attached to
conviction and punishment of a juvenile than of an adult; a teenager's
criminality should not hang over him like a cloud for the rest of his life....
[Tihe stigma [of juvenile courts] is milder and less enduring that that
provided by the criminal courts.
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separate system of juvenile courts is more consistent with the
rehabilitative interests of youthful offenders than would be the case
if all juvenile cases were tried in criminal court, even if scaled-down
punishments were implemented.247 While not beyond dispute, being
labeled a "delinquent" by a juvenile court appears less stigmatic-
both in the minds of offenders248 and to the community at large-
than that attached to "criminals" convicted in adult court.249 Given
that the vast majority of young people who commit criminal acts
while minors eventually outgrow their deviance,2 50 the "delinquent"
label connotes understandable, for some even normal, behavior. 251
Furthermore, given the tendency to transfer serious juvenile
offenders to criminal court,252 the delinquency label connotes not
simply that the individual offender is similar to many other young
people, but also that he or she likely committed a relatively minor
offense. 25 3 None of this follows when one is stigmatized "criminal," a
label connoting neither immature foolishness nor minor offense.
CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 356 (1978).
"[Tihe end result of a declaration of delinquency 'is significantly different
from and less onerous than a finding of criminal guilt."' McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 540 (1971) (quoting In re Terry, 265 A.2d 350, 355 (Pa. 1970)). Another
commentator concluded that the stigma of being classified a delinquent has been
overestimated. Supra note 227, at 1157. But see Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice
Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1231 (1970) (stating a
"juvenile delinquent is viewed as a junior criminal hardly less threatening ... than
his more mature counterpart"); Francis Barry McCarthy, The Role of the Concept of
Responsibility in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 181,
213 (1977) ("[A] stigma attaches to a delinquent in a manner similar to an adult
criminal.").
247. Supra note 246. I have made this argument elsewhere. See Gardner,
Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 20, at 68-70; Martin R. Gardner, Punitive
Juvenile Justice: Some Observations on a Recent Trend, 10 INT'L. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
129, 148-49 (1987).
248. See Jack Donald Foster et al., Perceptions of Stigma Following Public
Intervention for Delinquent Behavior, 20 SOC. PROBS. 202 (1972) (finding that only a
few boys adjudicated delinquent felt seriously handicapped by their encounter with
the juvenile court relative to their interpersonal relationships with family, friends, or
teachers).
249. See supra note 246.
250. Supra note 205.
251. Id.
252. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
253. Theorists point out that the term "criminal" tends to "over laber through its
failure to describe precise types of deviant behavior(s) triggering the label, the
seriousness of those behaviors, or their social context. Ronald A. Feldman, Legal
Lexicon, Social Labeling, and Juvenile Rehabilitation, 2 OFFENDER REHAB. 19, 24-25
(1977). The term "delinquent," on the other hand, connotes an offense committed by a
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
All of these considerations argue that the rehabilitative interests
of young people are better protected in juvenile rather than in
criminal courts. As a "constitutionally exceptional class," 254 juvenile
offenders are entitled to a meaningful opportunity for rehabilitation
to demonstrate maturity and reform25 5-an opportunity that
implicitly must begin in juvenile court.
2. Waiver Criteria
If the juvenile system is not likely to allow a juvenile a
"meaningful opportunity" to be rehabilitated, then transfer to
criminal court may be appropriate. The only relevant transfer
consideration is, therefore, whether a particular offender is
amenable to rehabilitation in juvenile court.256
However, as noted above,257 state waiver statutes routinely
include considerations in addition to amenability to rehabilitation,
such as the seriousness of the crime charged and the perceived
dangerousness of the juvenile, 258 considerations, which speak to
minor which, while perhaps serious, is at least not necessarily serious enough to
merit disposition in criminal court. As one commentator observed: "When a juvenile
is transferred and tried in adult court, the consequences of criminal conviction are
readily apparent and warrant a vigorous defense, but for a child facing a delinquency
adjudication, the criminal consequences of his or her adjudication may not be clear."
Courtney P. Fain, What's in a Name? The Worrisome Interchange of Juvenile
"Adjudications" with Criminal "Convictions," 49 B.C. L. REV. 495, 523 (2008).
254. Colgan, supra note 190, at 85. Professor Scott sees a "special status" for
juveniles under the Eighth Amendment. Scott, supra note 142, at 75.
255. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 237. If the right to rehabilitation is to be given meaning,
waiver standards should focus only on amenability to rehabilitation. As Christopher
Slobogin puts it "only if no treatment is available in the juvenile system should
transfer to adult court be considered." Slobogin, supra note 242, at 299. If juveniles
are amenable to treatment, they by definition pose no future danger to society if
their rehabilitation is successful. On this view, the seriousness of the crime charged
is irrelevant to the transfer decision. Seriousness of the offense is a retributive
consideration and along with the blameworthiness of the offender, goes to giving
offenders their just deserts. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 6
(people should be punished because they deserve it, severity of punishment depends
on the seriousness of the crime); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE
JUSTICE 49 (2005) (seriousness of an offense is a factor in determining the amount of
punishment the offense deserves). As Slobogin puts it: "Intuitively and empirically,
the nature of the offense in the abstract bears no relationship to treatability" and
may in fact bear "a negative relationship to treatability." Slobogin, supra note 242, at
317.
257. Supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
258. The seriousness of the crime charged and concerns with incapacitating
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interests different from 259-and which often override-the
rehabilitation factor in judicial waiver decisions. 260 While such
multi-factored criteria were acceptable prior to the Supreme Court's
identification of juveniles as a categorically distinct constitutional
class,26 1  those criteria would constitute unconstitutional
infringements of a juvenile offender's rehabilitation right.
In addition to the requirements just noted, juveniles in waiver
hearings are, of course, still entitled to the procedural protections
guaranteed by the Supreme Court in the Kent case.262 These
protections include the right to counsel, access to social reports
assessing the circumstances of the juvenile, and a record of the
waiver court's findings for possible appellate review purposes.2 63
If, after a consideration of an accused offender's amenability to
rehabilitation, the juvenile court judge concludes that a particular
juvenile is not likely to be rehabilitated in the juvenile system, 264 the
perceived dangerous offenders routinely join, and often override, the amenability to
treatment criterion. Summarizing the empirical research on the matter, Slobogin
concludes that "the amenability to treatment inquiry often ends up being an inquiry
about something else. Rather than focusing on treatability, the courts appear to be
driven by a mix of incapacitative, retributive and rehabilitative concerns, with the
latter focus routinely taking a back seat to the first two objectives." Slobogin, supra
note 242, at 300. He thus concludes that "[riather than representing a genuine
attempt to assess a child's treatability, courts' evaluation of amenability focuses
more on culpability and dangerousness." Id. at 330.
While such a situation was constitutionally permissible prior to the Roper,
Graham, and Miller cases, when "juveniles [had] no 'right' to juvenile court
disposition in the first place," id. at 323 (citing cases), waiver standards allowing a
focus on anything other than amenability to rehabilitation would run afoul of a
juvenile offenders prima facie right to rehabilitation within the juvenile justice
system. Thus, the waiver standard statutes of virtually all states are now
unconstitutional.
259. The seriousness of the crime speaks to retributive demands for doing justice
while the dangerousness factor speaks to protecting the public through
incapacitating those posing a threat with no suggestion of rehabilitation. See supra
notes 256, 258.
260. See supra note 258.
261. Indeed, the criteria are either identical, or very similar, to those
recommended by the Supreme Court itself in the Kent case, supra notes 96-97 and
accompanying text.
262. See supra note 96.
263. Id.
264. A host of complicated issues are involved in determining amenability to
treatment. In the first place, a viable treatment program must be available within
the state's juvenile system. If such is not the case, the state will be under an
obligation to create effective services for juvenile offenders similar to the
requirements imposed by the Court in implementing Graham's parole release
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judge may transfer the case to criminal court where, as discussed
above, 265 upon conviction the juvenile would enjoy a right to a Miller
pre-sentence hearing and a sentence providing a realistic
opportunity for rehabilitation with possible parole release, and-if
deemed amenable to rehabilitation at the pre-sentence hearing-a
disposition in the juvenile system if that affords the best
rehabilitative opportunity. 266
requirement. See supra note 160. Even before the emergence of the right to
rehabilitation, some commentators had argued the Supreme Court case law might
mandate treatment that "obviates the need for pure incapacitation." Slobogin, supra
note 242, at 324.
Assuming adequate state programs are in place, determining a particular
juvenile's amenability to success therefrom is a difficult matter within the short time
frame of a waiver hearing. Moreover, a particular problem arises: Juveniles
approaching the age of termination of juvenile court jurisdiction who are amenable to
treatment within a reasonable period of time are routinely deemed "nonamenable"
simply because they will reach the cutoff age for juvenile court jurisdiction before
successful rehabilitation could likely occur. Slobogin, supra note 242, at 326. A
solution to this problem could be achieved if, as in many states, the dispositional age
of jurisdiction is extended to 21 or beyond. Id. at 326.
Also relevant in predicting amenability to treatment is whether the juvenile
has committed past offenses. Slobogin points out that "[i]f past offenses did not
trigger meaningful treatment, or ended in diversion out of the system, then they
should ordinarily not weigh heavily in the amenability determination." Id. at 318.
Thus, past treatment attempts become a crucial consideration. "Ideally, courts would
examine the precise type of treatment provided in the past to ascertain whether the
proper treatment course was utilized and, if so, whether it was effectively
implemented." Id. at 319.
Without going into all the problems entailed in clarifying the meaning
treatment amenability, it is helpful to consider Professor Slobogin's proposed
definition:
A juvenile's amenability to treatment depends upon the extent to which: (1)
those aspects of the juvenile's personality and environment (2) that
contribute significantly to an increased risk of criminal behavior (3) can be
ameliorated by age [21] through individual, family or community-oriented
intervention (4) that is available under the juvenile court system and
applicable law.
Id. at 331.
265. Supra notes 204-28 and accompanying text.
266. Supra notes 204-14 and accompanying text. Again, a juvenile court judicial
waiver proceeding does not satisfy the Miller hearing requirement.
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B. Legislative Exclusion and Direct File Now Unconstitutional
If judicial waiver hearings are constitutionally mandated for all
offenders, it follows that legislative exclusion and direct file
provisions are unconstitutional. The discussion immediately below
so demonstrates.
1. Legislative Exclusion
As noted above, statutes in most states grant criminal courts
exclusive jurisdiction over youths of certain ages charged with
certain offenses, thus precluding any consideration of amenability to
treatment through the juvenile court. 267 Historically, the courts have
upheld the constitutionality of such statutes. 268
A leading 1972 case, United States v. Bland,269 from the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit provides a vivid
illustration of how the rehabilitation right changes the legislative
exclusion landscape. The Bland Court upheld amendments to the
District of Columbia juvenile code which repealed earlier provisions
granting juvenile courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all
juvenile cases while instead granting criminal court jurisdiction over
minors between sixteen and eighteen charged with certain serious
offenses.270 The statute required trial of these offenses in criminal
267. See supra notesl08-09 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Bishop v. State, 462 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1995) (upholding against due
process and separation of powers attack regarding a Georgia statute granting
exclusive original jurisdiction to criminal courts over juveniles age 13 and over
charged with enumerated serious crimes but allowing prosecutorial discretion in
cases of "extraordinary cause" to decline to prosecute in criminal court and bring the
case in juvenile court); People v. J.S., 469 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. 1984) (upholding against
due process and equal protection attack on an Illinois statute exempting from
juvenile court jurisdiction 15 and 16-year-olds charged with enumerated serious
offenses); State v. Leach, 425 So. 2d 1232 (La. 1983) (upholding against equal
protection attack a Louisiana statute exempting from juvenile court jurisdiction
cases of juveniles 15 years of age and over charged with committing enumerated
serious offenses); In re Boot, 925 P.2d 964 (Wash. 1996) (upholding against equal
protection and due process attack on a Washington statute granting exclusive
original jurisdiction in criminal courts over cases of juveniles age 16 and over
charged with committing enumerated serious offenses).
269. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied 412
U.S. 909 (1973). Professor Feld describes Bland as "the leading case on legislative
offense exclusion statues." FELD, supra note 94, at 240.
270. Prior to their amendment, the District of Columbia statutes granted
juvenile courts exclusive jurisdiction over all "children," defined as "a person under
18 years of age." U.S. v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1330-31 (1972) (Wright, J.,
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court, thus foreclosing a juvenile court waiver hearing with the
attendant due process protections required by Kent.2 7 1 The Bland
court distinguished Kent, finding it applicable only to statutory
models fixing original jurisdiction in juvenile courts with possible
judicial waiver to criminal court,272 concluding that access to juvenile
court was essentially a matter of legislative grace and not
constitutional entitlement.
With this understanding, the Bland court disagreed with the
spirited dissent of Judge Skelly Wright who argued that "a child
may [not] be summarily deprived of his right to juvenile treatment
without being heard,"' 273 claiming that the "crucially important
[decision] between the treatment afforded children in an adult court
and that granted them in [juvenile court]" could not be made without
the protections of a judicial waiver hearing with Kent protections. 274
The essence of Judge Wright's argument was that juveniles
charged with criminal offenses have prima facie rights to
treatment-rehabilitation-within the juvenile system that cannot
be denied without a showing that the particular accused offender
could not benefit from that system. The weakness of Wright's
position was, of course, simply that there existed no legal support for
his claim. Prior to the Supreme Court's recent identification of
juveniles as a constitutionally-distinct class, the courts had
consistently held with the Bland majority that juvenile court
dissenting). The amendment (16 D.C. CODE ANN. § 2301)(3)(A) (1972)) excluded from
the definition of "child" individuals who are sixteen years of age or older and charged
with murder, forcible rape, first degree burglary, armed robbery, and certain other
offenses. Bland, 472 F.2d at 1330-31 (Wright, J., dissenting).
While charges brought under the § 2301(3)(A) amendment granted
exclusive jurisdiction to the criminal courts, federal prosecutors could choose not to
charge under the amendment and instead bring a case in juvenile court, even though
the crime charged was one included under the amendment. See Pendergast v. United
States, 332 A.2d 919, 922-23 (D.C. 1975) (juvenile charged in juvenile court with
assault with intent to kill, an offense which could have been brought under §
2301(3)(A)). In this sense, the statute in Bland could be understood as a concurrent
jurisdiction, direct file measure. Indeed, in his treatise Dean Davis categorizes Bland
under his § 2:9 "prosecutorial discretion" section rather than under his § 2:8
"exclusion of certain conduct from jurisdiction" section. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES,
supra note 15, at 40, 30-38.
271. For discussion of Kent, see supra note 96.
272. The court appealed to separation of powers principles in finding that it was
"without power to interfere with or override [or review] the exercise of [federal
prosecutors'] discretion" to charge juveniles with crimes within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the criminal court. Bland, 472 F.2d at 1337.
273. Id. at 1348 (Wright, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 1344.
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treatment was statutorily based and not a matter of constitutional
right.275 After the Roper/Graham/Miller cases, however, with their
support for a right to an opportunity for rehabilitation, Judge
Wright's position becomes compelling.
Indeed, as shown above, under the implications of
Roper/Graham/Miller juveniles are now entitled to judicial hearings
in juvenile court before their cases could be transferred to criminal
court. Because legislative exclusion statutes provide no such
hearing,276 these statutes are unconstitutional. 277
Thus, a right to a judicial waiver in juvenile courts would not be
satisfied by "reverse certification" provisions in some states that
grant original jurisdiction over certain offenses to criminal courts
with authority-often discretionary-to transfer cases to juvenile
court,278 sometimes with a rebuttable presumption in favor of
keeping cases in criminal court.279 While historically courts have
275. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 530 N.W.2d 420 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (juveniles do
not have a "due process right to individualized treatment" in waiver procedures or at
sentencing because such "is neither explicitly nor inherently found in the
Constitution"); State v. A.L., 638 A.2d 814, 818 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)
("statutes governing transfer from juvenile court do not involve a fundamental
right"); Lane v. Jones, 257 S.E.2d 525, 527 (Ga. 1979) ("[tireatment as a juvenile is
not an inherent right but one granted by the [legislature which] .. . may restrict or
qualify that right as it sees fit").
276. There are numerous legislative exclusion statutes in many states. For some
examples, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2200 (West 2014) (mandating criminal court
jurisdiction for juveniles over age 13 charged with class A felonies); ALA. CODE § 12-
15-102(6) (West 2014) (exempting enumerated offenses from juvenile court
jurisdiction); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-3(H) (West 2014) (exempting from juvenile
court jurisdiction individuals 15 or older charged with committing first-degree
murder). For an extensive list of examples of legislative exclusion statutes, see
DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 15, at 31-34 n. 3.
277. While legislative exclusion statutes often apply only to older juveniles
committing serious crimes, see supra note 108 and accompanying text, there is
nothing about the age of an offender or the seriousness of the crime charged which
necessarily precludes amenability for treatment in the juvenile system. See supra
note 264. Therefore, individual judicial waiver hearings are necessary to determine a
particular juvenile's amenability to rehabilitation.
278. The process is called "reverse certification" because it is the reverse of the
usual process by which cases arrive in criminal court after a waiver hearing in
juvenile court. DAVIS, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 54, at 262 n. 56.
279. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-11-3.1 (Supp. 2015), which provides:
Any delinquent child sixteen years of age or older against whom [designated
felony] charges have been filed shall be tried in circuit court as an adult.
However, the child may request a transfer hearing which shall be conducted
... to determine if it is in the best interest of the public that the child be
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upheld these provisions, 28 0 they obviously circumvent the right to
original juvenile court jurisdiction. None of the reverse certification
measures presently in place require the decision to be solely in terms
of the accused offenders' amenability to rehabilitation, as I have
argued, is now constitutionally required.28 1 But even if that criterion
were applied in reverse certification hearings, the process would still
inadequately protect the juvenile's right to a judicial waiver as a
prerequisite to punishment. Juvenile court judges-with their access
to the resources of the juvenile system and their considerable
experience in dealing with youthful offenders-are arguably better
able to assess amenability to rehabilitation than are their criminal
court counterparts. Moreover, the process of reverse certification
unnecessarily casts the "criminal" label on the juvenile, even if he or
she is ultimately transferred to juvenile court. The stigma of being
initially charged as a criminal in criminal court would still attach.28 2
These considerations strongly suggest that reverse certification
procedures do not comply with a juvenile's right to a meaningful
opportunity for rehabilitation entailed in Roper/Graham/Miller.
2. Direct File, Concurrent Jurisdiction
As already mentioned, a dozen or so states grant concurrent
jurisdiction to either juvenile or criminal courts to adjudicate certain
juvenile cases.28 3 Under such measures, prosecutors are granted
discretion as to which court to bring these cases. While one state,
Arkansas, allows juveniles a right to a waiver hearing in juvenile
court upon request as a prerequisite to assumption of jurisdiction by
tried in circuit court as an adult. In such a transfer hearing, there is a
rebuttable presumption that it is in the best interest of the public that any
child, sixteen years of age or older, who is charged with a [designated
felony], shall be tried as an adult.
Id. See infra note 285 for other examples of reverse certification provisions.
280. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cotto, 753 A.2d 217 (Pa. 2000) (due process not
violated by statute placing burden of proof on juvenile seeking transfer from adult
criminal court to juvenile court); State ex rel. Coats v. Rakestraw, 610 P.2d 256
(Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (reverse certification does not violate equal protection or due
process); State v. Martin, 530 N.W.2d 420 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (reverse certification
presuming juvenile will be kept in the adult system unless it is found that he or she
cannot receive adequate treatment does not violate due process or equal protection).
281. For examples of reverse certification provisions in the context of direct file
statutes, see infra note 285.
282. See supra notes 245-53.
283. See supra text and notes 114-16.
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the criminal court,28 4 all other direct file jurisdictions deny juvenile
court waiver hearings, although most allow for reverse certification
hearings in criminal court.28 5
When attacked, the courts historically have upheld the
constitutionality of concurrent jurisdiction direct file measures. 28 6 A
284. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(2) (2015) (direct file option for 14 or 15-
year-olds charged with enumerated serious offenses with, upon motion of "any
party," a hearing in juvenile court as prerequisite to transfer to criminal court).
285. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STATS § 13-501(B), (C), (E) (West 2014) (direct file
option for enumerated serious felonies with a criminal court order required, after a
hearing, to transfer non "chronic felony offenders" to juvenile court); COLO. REV.
STAT. Ann. § 19-2-517(1), (3)(a) (2015) (direct file option for juveniles 16 and older
charged with enumerated serious felonies with a right to a "reverse transfer hearing"
upon request by the juvenile); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2(15), 15-11-560(a)(e) (2014)
(juvenile and criminal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over juveniles charged
with offenses which are punishable by loss of life, LWOP, or life imprisonment, with
possible reverse certification for "extraordinary cause" of juveniles 13 to 17 years of
age charged with enumerated offenses); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-206(1), (3) (2015)
(direct file option for juveniles over age 12 charged with enumerated serious offenses
with a required hearing in criminal court to determine "whether the matter must be
transferred back to juvenile courts"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 2-5-206(A) to (C),
(F) (Supp. 2015) (direct file option for "youthful offenders" over age 15 charged with
enumerated offenses with optional reverse certification hearing); VT. STAT. ANN., tit.
33, §§ 5102(a)(2)(C); 5203(b) (2014) (direct file option for juvenile over age 16 charged
with enumerated serious offenses with criminal court discretion to transfer the
proceedings to juvenile court); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-6-203(f), 14-6-237 (West 2014)
(direct file option-with specified determinative factors for prosecutorial
consideration-for juveniles age 17 charged with felonies with criminal court
discretion to order a reverse certification hearing).
Several states allow for direct file in criminal court while apparently
denying the possibility of reverse certification. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
707(d) (West 2014) (direct file option for juveniles 16 and older charged with
enumerated offenses and for juveniles 14 and older for enumerated offenses under
certain circumstances); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.557(l)(a)(1), (b) (West 2014) (direct file
option for juveniles 14 or older charged with enumerated offenses and for juveniles
16 or older charged with any felony offense); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(B)(3)
(2016) (direct file option for juveniles charged with enumerated offenses); MASS.
GEN. LAWS Ann. ch. 119, § 54 (West 2014) (direct file option for juveniles 14 and
older charged with enumerated offenses who have previously been committed to
Department of Youth Services or who have committed an offense involving illegal
infliction, or threat, of serious bodily harm); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.lf(1)(2)
(West 2014) (direct file option for juveniles over 14 charged with committing
enumerated offenses); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(D) (West 2014) (direct file for
juveniles 14 and older committing enumerated offenses if juvenile court fails to find
probable cause or dismisses warrant or petition).
286. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 827 S.W.2d 637 (Ark. 1992) (upholding direct file
measure and allowing criminal court to retain jurisdiction even though charge
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California case, Manduley v. Superior Court,28 7 is representative.
Pursuant to the California statute, 288 a prosecutor filed enumerated
felony charges against juveniles directly in criminal court.
Upholding the statute against, inter alia, separation of powers, due
process and equal protection attacks, the California Supreme Court
rejected claims of a statutory right to be subject to juvenile court
jurisdiction, holding that
[W]hen governing statutes provide that the juvenile court
and the criminal court have concurrent jurisdiction, minors
who come within the scope of [such statutes] do not possess
any right to be placed under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court before the prosecutor initiates a proceeding accusing
them of a crime. Thus, the asserted interest that petitioners
seek to protect through a judicial hearing does not exist.289
The court found similarly unpersuasive a claim that juvenile
offenders possess a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in their
cases originating in the juvenile system, which would preclude the
prosecutor from directly filing their cases in criminal court.290
Distinguishing Kent, the court found "no . . .protected interest in
remaining in the juvenile system."291 Therefore "[a] statute that
authorizes discretionary direct filing in criminal court . . .does not
require [the Kent] procedural protections. '"292
As with the legislative exclusion statutes discussed above, 293
direct file provisions are unconstitutional if the implications of
Graham are fully realized. 294 Again, the "meaningful opportunity for
reduced to a lesser-included offense not otherwise within the scope of the direct file
statute); Chapman v. State, 385 S.E.2d 661, 662 (Ga. 1989) (direct file upheld, no
constitutional right to juvenile court adjudication); Myers v. District Court 518 P.2d
836 (Colo. 1974) (direct file statute upheld).
287. Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3 (Cal. 2002).
288. See supra note 285 for reference to the statute.
289. Manduley, 41 P.3d at 20.
290. Id. at 21.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 22.
293. See supra notes 267-77.
294. Again, none of statutory elements permitting direct file necessarily preclude
the accused's amenability to rehabilitation. See supra note 277. Thus, for example,
the mere fact of past adjudication for a felony does not necessarily mean an accused
has exhausted his or her right to rehabilitation, as illustrated by State v. Cain, 381
So.2d 1361 (Fla. 1980). In Cain, the Florida Supreme Court upheld a direct file
provision allowing prosecutors to file charges in criminal court against juveniles 16
and older who have in the past committed two delinquent acts, one of which involved
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rehabilitation" would require judicial waiver hearings in juvenile
court as a prerequisite to any trial in criminal court.
C. Punishment within the Juvenile Justice System
While current juvenile systems have become increasingly
punitive, 295 they accommodate the reduced culpability of juveniles by
scaling down the severity of sentences from those imposed on adults
in the criminal system committing the same crime.296 Two
conflicting policy considerations are reflected in the emergence of
punishment within the traditional non-punitive model.297 For some
theorists, punishment in the juvenile system is, in a sense, actually
good for juvenile offenders 298 and is thus at home with rehabilitative
goals, especially when followed by extensive follow-up counseling. 299
a felony. Id. at 1362. Again, the statutory requirements of past adjudication and
disposition in juvenile court do not necessarily mean that juveniles whose cases are
directly filed in criminal court under these conditions have had a meaningful
opportunity for rehabilitation. Treatment may not even have been offered, and if it
was, it might not have been meaningful. See supra note 264.
295. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
296. Supra note 88 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
298. Even though many theorists recognize that most juveniles outgrow their
acts of delinquency, some argue that does not mean that they should not receive
some punishment for their offences. Developmental psychologists recognize the
importance of lessons in accountability amounting to more than mere slaps on the
wrist. Scott & Grisso, supra note 59, at 187. "The fact that many youthful offenders
will desist in their criminal activity as they mature does not justify a license to
offend during adolescence." Id. Franklin Zimring expresses similar views:
[N]o learning role is complete without, in some measure, learning
responsibility for conduct .... Just as the learning theory of adolescence
implies a transition toward adulthood, so too it also implies a progression
toward adult levels of responsibility. The adolescent must be protected from
the full burden of adult responsibilities, but pushed along by degrees
toward the moral and legal accountability that we consider appropriate to
adulthood.
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 95-96 (1982).
In the words of one commentator: "[T]he very concept of rehabilitation may include a
serious message that consequences follow conduct. . . . When children commit
heinous crimes, swift and definite punishment is an essential part of both 'justice'
and 'rehabilitation.' Catherine J. Ross, Disposition in a Discretionary Regime:
Punishment and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1037,
1059 (1995).
299. See Sheffer, supra note 51.
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For others, the move to punitive dispositions constitutes a decision
to deemphasize rehabilitation in favor of just deserts and deterrence
theory.300 In any event, with punishment comes possible scrutiny
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 301 Thus, the principles of the Roper/Graham/Miller
cases speak to both the criminal and juvenile justice systems.
Punishment is manifested in juvenile systems in two contexts: 1)
through systematic and explicit determinate statutory provisions
linking punitive dispositions to specific offenses; and 2) through
pockets of punitive dispositions within otherwise indeterminate,
rehabilitative models. The manner in which the right to
rehabilitation affects these two contexts will be discussed in turn.
300. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets... Punishment, supra note 44, at 852-53
(describing the Washington system as embracing "just deserts" sentencing principles
aimed at assuring individual accountability, rather than rehabilitation).
301. While the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment applies
only to "criminal punishment," it is surely arguable that punishment by juvenile
courts for acts of delinquency, which entail commission of "criminal" statutes, would
qualify for Eighth Amendment coverage. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
The Supreme Court has required that virtually all the procedural protections of
criminal trials be afforded juveniles in delinquency proceedings. See In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967) (rights to notice of charges, assistance of counsel, rights of
confrontation and cross-examination, and protections of the privilege against self-
incrimination); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970) (beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof required in criminal trials also required in delinquency
adjudications); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 545 (1975) (delinquency adjudications
constitute being placed in jeopardy for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause). But
see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (jury not constitutionally required
in delinquency proceedings). These decisions among other things, have led Professor
Feld to see juvenile courts as "scaled-down, second class criminal court[s] for young
offenders." FELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION, supra note 94, at 22.
For a case applying the Eighth Amendment to a juvenile court disposition,
see In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012) (holding sex offender registration and
notification requirements on juvenile sex offenders to be cruel and unusual
punishment, relying on Graham). One dissenter in C.P. argued that the disposition
was not punitive and was thus outside Eighth Amendment protection. Id. at 752-55
(O'Donnell, J., dissenting).
For a case applying the Eighth Amendment to a juvenile disposition, but
finding it not disproportionately severe, see In re Sturm, 2006 WL 3861074 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2006) (upheld serious youthful offender dispositional sentencing scheme). For
cases denying Eighth Amendment coverage because juvenile dispositions were
deemed rehabilitative and not "punishment" under the Eighth Amendment, see In re
B.Q.L.E., 676 S.E.2d 742 (Ga. App. 2009); In re Rodney H., 861 N.E. 2d 623 (Ill.
2006); In re Kelly, No. 98AP-588, 1999 WL 132862 (Ohio App. 1999).
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1. Systematic Punishment
As mentioned above, Washington was the first state to enact a
systematically punitive juvenile system. The Washington example is
thus useful in examining the impact of the right to rehabilitation on
punitive juvenile justice systems. As with other such models,
Washington imposes punishments scaled-down from those imposed
on similarly situated adult offenders. Sentences are determined by
presumptive sentencing guidelines that fix dispositions to the
seriousness of the offense 30 2 and increase their severity with the
advancing age of the offender, thus reflecting the increased
culpability of older juveniles. 30 3 Thus, legislative purpose statements
declare that the system is intended to be punitive. 304 Therefore,
sentences administered through the system clearly constitute
punishment.3 05
Therefore, the demands of Graham and Miller apply. This means
that mandatory punitive sentences 306 deny the right to pre-
sentencing Miller hearings required in order to assess the offender's
amenability to rehabilitation. 30 7 No present systematically punitive
system meets these demands.
302. See Feld, Juvenile Court Meets... Punishment, supra note 44, at 853.
303. Walkover, supra note 55, at 531.
304. Supra note 86 and accompanying text; Henning, supra note 240, at 1113-14,
1133 (purpose clauses reflecting growing concern for "accountability of offending
youth," an attempt to "soft pedal the introduction of retributivist goals into juvenile
court").
305. See supra note 36 and accompanying text for a definition of "punishment."
306. The Washington system allows judges to suspend a statutorily-defined
disposition and order the offender to participate in a treatment program. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §13.40.0357 (2014) (Option B). Similarly, the Kansas system, which is
also systematically punitive, grants the court discretion to impose non-punitive
sentencing alternatives, some rehabilitative in nature, e.g. probation, counseling and
drug evaluation. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2361 (2014). For a case describing the
punitive nature of the Kansas system, see In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008)
(holding that a sentence constituted punishment, thus recognizing the juvenile
offender's right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment). While not as
systematically punitive as Washington or Kansas, New Jersey provides a table of
sentences authorizing substantial sentences for the most serious offenses and
proportionally shorter sentences for less serious offenses. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:4A-
44(d) (West 2014). However, juvenile court judges retain discretion over whether to
impose a punitive sentence, which if imposed must be based on legislatively
described offense-based criteria. Id. at §§ 2A:4A-43(a), 44(d) (West 2014).
307. See supra notes 190-221 and accompanying text for discussion of the
presentencing requirement. Neither Washington nor Kansas requires a showing of
non-amenability to rehabilitation as a precondition of a punitive disposition.
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Moreover, whenever a rigorous pre-sentence hearing establishes
that a given offender is not amenable to rehabilitation, the offender
may be sentenced to a term of punishment so long as a parole
release mechanism is in place should the offender be rehabilitated
during the punishment term.308  Thus, mandatory minimum
sentences are no longer constitutional. 309 If the pre-sentence hearing
reveals that the offender is amenable to treatment, he or she is
entitled to a rehabilitative disposition in lieu of a term of
punishment.
These considerations require that courts carefully distinguish
punitive and rehabilitative dispositions. If dispositions are
rehabilitative and not punitive, the requirement of an Eighth
Amendment pre-adjudication Miller hearing would be unobtainable.
This means that for rehabilitative dispositions, bifurcated
adjudication and disposition hearings would not be required,
rendering constitutionally permissible the practice in some states of
allowing juvenile court judges to order dispositions immediately
upon adjudication. 3 10 If, on the other hand, a disposition is punitive,
a Miller hearing separate from the adjudication hearing is required.
Thus, in this context, the conceptual distinction between
punishment and rehabilitation described above 31 1 becomes central as
a constitutionally necessary vehicle for defining the scope of the
Eighth Amendment rehabilitation right.3 12
308. See supra 190-221 and accompanying text for a discussion of the parole
release requirement.
309. Both the Washington and Kansas systems appear unconstitutional for
failing to provide parole release mechanisms.
310. See DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES supra note 15 (discussing cases upholding
the constitutionality of dispositions imposed immediately upon adjudication).
311. See supra text notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
312. Even in systems as obviously punitive as Washington's, courts sometimes
fail to honor the constitutional consequences of this distinction by mischaracterizing
punishment as "rehabilitation." See, e.g., State v. Chavez, 180 P.3d 1250 (Wash.
2008) (denying jury trial rights because the court deemed the juvenile system only
partially punitive and primarily rehabilitative).
Sometimes courts make the opposite mistake of characterizing as "punitive"
dispositions that are in fact rehabilitative, often applying the misguided "impact
theory" described supra at note 39. See, e.g., In re Hezzie R. 580 N.W.2d 660 (Wis.
1998) (merely housing juveniles in adult facilities constituted "punishment" even
though the terms of confinement were indeterminate and individualized plans were
in place aimed at reuniting juveniles with their families-as a result, juveniles could
not be transferred to such adult facilities without a jury determination).
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2. Punishment Within Rehabilitative Systems
Unlike states like Washington and Kansas, the juvenile systems
in most states continue to embrace the rehabilitative ideal, imposing
indeterminate dispositions aimed at reforming the offender. 313
Nevertheless, within these systems pockets of punishment
sometimes exist, triggering the same Eighth Amendment
implications as those visited upon systematically punitive models.
Proper application of the Eighth Amendment depends, of course, on
recognizing a sanction as punitive. Unfortunately, courts have often
failed in this recognition, mistakenly characterizing punitive
dispositions as rehabilitative. 314
A Delaware case, State v. J.K.,315 provides a vivid example. A
state statute required that juveniles adjudicated delinquent be
confined for at least six months 316 if they had committed two or more
statutorily enumerated felonies within a one-year period. Despite
the fact that such sentences clearly evidenced punishment-
imposing on their recipients determinate terms of unpleasantness
through institutional confinement because of the commission of
prohibited offenses 3 17-the Delaware court nevertheless found them
rehabilitative, thus defeating claims that the sentences could not be
imposed without jury determinations of guilt.318
Instead of carefully considering whether the sentences might be
punitive, the J.K. court simply begged the constitutional question by
appeal to the statute's purpose clause, which characterized
delinquency matters as "civil" in nature with the aim of achieving
"control, care, and treatment" of juveniles.3 19 The court added that
the rehabilitative interests were actually reflected in the mandatory
sentencing law, which it characterized as "an attempt to salvage
something in a juvenile who has committed ... two separate felonies
313. See supra note 84 (as of 1988 two-thirds of the states had failed to embrace
offense-based determinate sentencing. Despite the emergence of punitive aspects,
"the ameliorative purposes, and the rehabilitative philosophy for the most part has
endured" in the juvenile court movement. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note
15, at 5.
314. See, e.g., supra note 312 (the Chavez case).
315. State v. J.K., 383 A.2d 283 (Del. 1977).
316. The statute actually required institutional confinement for one year, but
allowed judges' discretion to suspend confinement in excess of six months. Id. at 285.
317. See the definition of punishment, supra note 36 and accompanying text.
318. Technically, the court did not rule on the jury trial issue because it was not
adequately briefed, but with its finding that the sentences involved in the case were
non-punitive, it essentially eliminated any claim for a right to trial by jury.
319. J.K, 383 A.2d at 286-87.
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in one year [which] begin[s] with a mandatory commitment for a six-
month minimum." 3
20
Such careless analysis would deny juveniles realization of their
rehabilitation right. How that right would be implicated when
provisions like the statute in D.K. are correctly characterized as
punitive can be illustrated by a consideration of the current version
of the Delaware statute.
Similar to the statute in D.K., current Delaware law requires
juvenile court judges to impose minimum sentences of six months
upon "child[ren] in need of mandated institutional treatment."3 2 1
Such children are those who have been adjudicated delinquents for
committing felonies and who commit subsequent felonies within a
twelve-month period. Juveniles committed under these provisions
must serve at least six months unless the court determines that it is
in the "best interest of the child's treatment" to participate in
programs outside the institution, or a judge determines that "the
child has so progressed in a course of mandated institutional
treatment [so] that release would best serve both the welfare of the
public and the interest of the child."32 2
Despite its characterization as "mandated institutional
treatment," the offense-based, determinate nature of the Delaware
disposition belies a rehabilitative characterization and instead
renders the disposition punitive.323 Thus the Graham and Miller
requirements of a rigorous pre-sentence hearing and a parole release
mechanism are applicable. The mandatory commitment under the
Delaware statute is triggered by past adjudications, which do not
necessarily entail exhaustion of the offender's right to a meaningful
opportunity for rehabilitation. 324 Thus, unless it could be shown that
a particular juvenile had been exposed to effective treatment in the
past,325 a pre-sentencing Miller amenability hearing is required prior
to imposing the mandated institutional punishment, a disposition
that would be permissible only if the juvenile is shown not to be
amenable to rehabilitation. As for Graham's parole release
requirement, the Delaware statute satisfies that demand.326
Punishment provisions in numerous states would be affected
should the implications of Graham's meaningful opportunity for
320. Id. at 289.
321. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1009 (West 2014).
322. Id. at (e)(1), (2), (3).
323. See the distinction between punishment and rehabilitation, supra notes 36-
44 and accompanying text.
324. Supra note 264.
325. Id.
326. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
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rehabilitation requirement and Miller's pre-sentencing hearing
mandate be given full effect.327 A cursory sample of the statutes
suggests that many statutes provide neither a Miller hearing nor a
Graham opportunity for rehabilitation and parole. 328
D. Summary
Recognition of the principles entailed in the Supreme Court's
Graham and Miller cases would require that juvenile courts exercise
original jurisdiction over all alleged juvenile offenders, transferring
them to criminal court only upon a judicial finding that a given
juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system.
This requirement would mean that many, if not all, of the waiver
criteria standards presently employed in juvenile systems are
unconstitutional, as are the legislative exclusion and direct file
statutes widely in place throughout the nation. Moreover,
mandatory punitive sentencing within juvenile systems would also
be unconstitutional.
These manifestations of the right to rehabilitation conceived in
the Court's Eighth Amendment cases would be significant,
impacting virtually all juvenile justice systems in one way or
another. Whether courts and policy makers actually follow the
Graham and Miller cases to their logical conclusions is, of course, not
clear. But if they do, the effect will be to bring juvenile courts back to
their original rehabilitative roots, a welcome development for those
championing the "humane purposes" of a juvenile system aimed at
"protect[ing] and nourish[ing] children."329
VI. WAIVING THE RIGHT TO REHABILITATION?
However Far It Will Eventually Extend, The Right To A
Meaningful Opportunity For Rehabilitation Granted To Juveniles By
Graham and Miller is an individual constitutional right protected by
327. See Feld, Juvenile Court Meets... Punishment, supra note 45, at 862-79 for
references to various statutes.
328. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-219 (West 2014) (children committing
enumerated felonies "shall be committed to the custody of the Department of Youth
Services where he or she shall remain for a minimum of one year"); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-140(i) (West 2014) (court given discretion to set a minimum twelve
month sentence to a residential facility for juveniles committing "serious" offenses);
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 353.5(3),(4)(a)(ii), (4)(a)(iv) (2008) (mandatory sentences of
twelve to eighteen months for offenders committing "designated felon[ies]" with no
release during the set term of the sentence).
329. Supra note 235.
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the Eighth Amendment, similar to the due process procedural
protections granted to juveniles in cases like Kent, Gault, and
Winship.330 As with those rights, individual juveniles are now
arguably entitled to governmental recognition of a rehabilitation
right, to the extent it has been defined in this Article.
As with their other rights, juveniles would almost always gladly
accept, and demand if not granted, the manifestations of their new
Eighth Amendment right. But what if an accused or convicted
juvenile disavows the rehabilitation right and instead asserts
Professor Fox's right to be punished-not rehabilitated- 331 along
the lines proposed for mature persons by Herbert Morris? 332 Indeed,
Florida law presently affords juveniles a statutory right to be
punished, permitting them to opt out of dispositions in juvenile court
and demand criminal court trial.333 Upon such demand, the juvenile
court must transfer the case to criminal court.334 Assuming
recognition of an Eighth Amendment right to a judicial waiver
hearing in juvenile court,335 would it be constitutionally permissible
for juveniles to waive this right? Would the other manifestations of
the rehabilitation right described in this Article be waiveable?
The Supreme Court has recognized that in some contexts
juveniles are permitted to waive constitutionally-mandated rights.
Thus, for example, the Court held in In re Gault that, while juveniles
are entitled to the assistance of counsel at delinquency
adjudications, accused juveniles may waive their counsel rights if
they do so intelligently and knowingly. 336
Whatever the waiver status of other constitutional rights, the
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment is almost certainly not waivable. 337 One cannot
330. Supra notes 96, 301 and accompanying text.
331. I have shown concepts of rehabilitation and punishment are theoretically
antithetical. Supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text. See supra text note 9 and
accompanying text.
332. Supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
333. FLA. R. JUV. P. Form 8.937 (West 2014) permits a "child" and his or her
parent to "demand ... voluntary waiver of [juvenile court] jurisdiction" and have the
case brought to trial "in adult court as if the child were an adult to face adult
punishments...."
334. "On demand ... the court shall... certify[ ] the case for trial as if the child
were an adult." FLA. R. Juv. P. RULE 8.105 (West 2014).
335. For discussion of the right to a judicial waiver hearing, see supra notes 236-
66 and accompanying text.
336. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile can waive counsel right if done so
intelligently and knowingly).
337. There are apparently no Supreme Court opinions directly on point, but
lower courts have found the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment not
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demand to be subjected to cruel punishment. As Justice White put it,
"the consent of a convicted defendant in a criminal case does not
privilege a state to impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment" 338 Justice Marshall has noted that, while
Eighth Amendment rights are possessed by individuals, society
shares an interest in living in a culture where cruel punishments are
not imposed: "Society's independent stake in enforcement of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment cannot be overridden by a defendant's purported
waiver."339 This means that juveniles would not be allowed to waive
any of the manifestations of the rehabilitation right identified in this
Article. 340 It also means that the Florida law noted above allowing a
waiver of a judicial transfer hearing in juvenile court 341 is
unconstitutional.
Unlike the right to be punished arguably possessed by
autonomous moral agents, the right to a meaningful opportunity for
rehabilitation flowing from the Roper, Graham, and Miller cases is
premised on the view that adolescents are a class distinct from fully-
accountable moral agents. Therefore, paternalistic responses to
juvenile offenders are not only appropriate, but also necessary, lest
these offenders be "abandoned" to the same practices and
punishments applicable to adults342-practices and policies that
disregard both the minimal culpability and the unique rehabilitative
amenability of young people.
waivable. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174, 181 (Pa. 1978) ("the
waiver concept was never intended as a means of allowing a criminal defendant to
choose his own sentence," thus waivers can never require courts to impose "an illegal
execution of a citizen"); State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 411 (S.C. 1985) (defendants
demanded castration, a form of cruel and unusual punishment under state analogue
to Eighth Amendment).
338. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1018 (White, J., dissenting) (court held
convicted defendant validly waived his right to appeal his death sentence).
339. Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 811 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (court
denied stay of convicted offender's execution). A leading commentator agrees.
Professor Richard Bonnie has stated that "it is clear that [one] may not waive [a]
constitutional ban and thus empower the state to impose a punishment that it is
otherwise forbidden to inflict." Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74
VA. L. REV. 1363, 1371 (1988). See also Lystra Batehoo, Waiving the Eighth
Amendment Protection from Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 689,
712-13 (2007).
340. See supra notes 205-215; 254-56, 306-309 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
342. Bruce Hafen has counseled against "abandoning youth" to adult rights and
responsibilities. See generally Hafen, supra note 118.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent Eighth Amendment cases have
made clear, seemingly once and for all, what all mothers know as a
matter of common sense: kids are different. However, the Court's
knowledge comes not just from common sense but, more
significantly, from a vast body of social science research
documenting the differences between adolescents and adults. In
recognizing these differences, the Court has blessed young people
with a unique constitutional status.
In this Article, I have explored the ramifications of this newly-
recognized status in terms of a non-waiveable rehabilitation right
spawned by in the Roper, Graham, and Miller cases-a right
representing the antithesis of the right to punishment arguably
possessed by adults. This right, if followed to its logical conclusions,
would grant juveniles in both the criminal and juvenile systems a
meaningful opportunity for rehabilitation.
Specifically, I have argued that this right means that, for
accused offenders, jurisdiction would necessarily originate
exclusively in juvenile court, with transfer to criminal court
permitted only if a juvenile court judge finds that a given juvenile is
not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system.
Punishment within that system could not be imposed unless it were
shown at a pre-dispositional hearing that an adjudicated delinquent
is not amenable to rehabilitation. Moreover, any punishment within
the juvenile system would be required to afford a meaningful
opportunity for rehabilitation and parole.
When juveniles are transferred to the criminal system, they
would be entitled to less severe punishment than that imposed on
adults committing the same crime. Upon conviction, they would be
entitled to a rigorous pre-sentencing hearing, taking into account
amenability for rehabilitation. If a given offender is deemed
unamenable to rehabilitation by the criminal court, he or she could
be given punitive sentences, so long as they carry a realistic
possibility of rehabilitation and parole if rehabilitation is achieved
during the sentence. If an offender is adjudged amenable to
rehabilitation at the pre-sentencing hearing, he or she should receive
a juvenile court disposition if that affords the best rehabilitative
opportunity.
I have shown that these requirements are entailed in the Roper,
Graham, and Miller cases, and, if put into effect by courts and
legislatures, would significantly impact both the criminal and
juvenile justice systems. Time will tell the extent of that impact. As
for the wisdom of recognizing the broad implications of the
rehabilitation right, if the science is correct and juveniles are indeed
uniquely amenable to reformation, implementing the reforms
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discussed in this Article would constitute a compassionate
recognition of that amenability and would likely pose little increased
risk to, and perhaps even greater protection of, society's interest in
being safeguarded from crime.

